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In order to avoid the development of the entire
conceptual design o-f a multilevel secure electronic mail
application, an approach is taken to develop the design
through the integration o-f multilevel security -features into
an existing conceptual design. The conceptual design o-f the
electronic mail application of the Integrated Software
System (ISS) is used as the source of application specific
functions. Thus the aim of the thesis is the conceptual
design of those features which would make the ISS electronic
mail application multilevel secure.
The first section of the thesis explores those issues
and areas of work which impact on the design of the security
features. The second section develops the conceptual design
of the security features. During the design, the author
establishes the attributes necessary to support multilevel
secure access mediation, defines a modularization which
supports and enhances security, and defines the user
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although computers have long been used to process
sensitive military information, the marriage of classified
information and computers has not been as blissful as
hoped. Part of the reason for this stems from the lack of
concern for computer security during the design and
implementation of both computer systems and their software,
resulting in inadequate internal security controls. In the
absence of such internal controls, the Department of Defense
<DoD) has had to establish extensive externally based
controls aimed at compensating for the lack of internal
ones. These compensatory efforts are evidenced in the
appearance of such modes of operations as dedicated, system
high, and periods processing. Such modes of operation do
heighten security but do not completely compensate far
proper internal security controls.
An increased effort has been made in recent years to
design and implement computer systems and software with
sufficient internal security controls to provide proper
protection of classified information. The end goal o-f such
an effort is the development of systems permitting sensitive
information of varying levels of classification and type to
be stored simultaneously on the system and selectively
accessed by users having varying security clearances and
8

access capabilities. Such systems would be considered to be
multilevel secure.
It is the application of this multilevel security
concept to the design of an electronic mail system that is
the topic o-f this thesis. In order to avoid the necessity
of developing both electronic mail functions and security
functions, the existing design of the Integrated Software
System's (ISS) CRef. 11 electronic mail application will be
used to provide the basic electronic mail functions. Thus,
the scope of this thesis is the conceptual design of those
features which would make the ISS electronic mail
application multilevel secure.
The thesis can be divided roughly into two interrelated
sections. The first section provides the reader with a
foundation of terminology and concepts underlying the
conceptual design by exploring those issues and areas of
work which have had an impact on the design decisions made
in the second section. Some of the issues covered are the
development of the DoD requirement for multilevel secure
systems, attempts to define the requirements of multilevel
security, and the role that formal models play in the
development of multilevel secure systems. Related work
topics include the ISS, secure military message systems,
modularization, and database security.
The second section of the thesis presents the conceptual
design of the multilevel security features for the

electronic mail application. The design has three primary
objectives. Since the selected application is based on the
relational database model, the -first objective is to
establish those attributes necessary to -fully support the
access mediation required of a multilevel secure electronic
mail application. The second objective is to de-fine a
modularisation of information and functions which supports
and enhances the security aspects of the application.
Finally, an attempt will be made to define the user





This chapter introduces the issues of multilevel
security and work in the area of developing multilevel
secure systems. Section B discusses the historical
development of the multilevel security issue and it
elaborates on the Department of Defense's (DoD) requirements
for multilevel secure systems. Section C presents a view of
efforts to refine the requirements of a multilevel secure
system. Section D, describes the role of formal models in
the development of secure systems.
B. DOD REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTILEVEL SECURITY
When one considers DoD requirements for multilevel
security, two facts must be initially stated. The first is
security. It is generally accepted that controls must be
established to restrict the handling of sensitive military
information. The exact controls implemented depend on the
classification (to include the level of classification and
any compartments and/or caveats) and the security policy in
effect at the time in question. The second fact is the
DoD's need for computers. It has been shown that the U.S.
falls short of quantitative superiority in a number of
defense forces. Computers, however, give the DoD a
qualitative factor which helps to overcome the quantitative
11

shortcomings. In the command, control, and communications
(C3) field alone, it has been noted that "good CZ Cccmmand,
control, and communications J capabilities can double or
triple -force effectiveness; conversely, ineffective CZ is
certain to jeopardize or deny the objective sought."
CRef. 2: pp. 17-183
Neither of the two facts taken alone have posed much
problem in the past. Well established procedures exist
which can effectively control the dissemination of
classified material via the traditional medium of paper.
CRef. 2: p. 173 No security problems are posed when
computers process non—sensi ti ve material. Since the merging
of the two (computer processing of sensitive material) in
first generation computers, computer security has been a
concern.
It is generally accepted, that since their initial
appearance following World War II, there have been at least
three basic generations of electronic computers. The first
generation (post WW II-around 1960) consisted largely of
"number crunchers" with technology based on relays and
vacuum tubes. CRef. 3: p. 590 3 These first generation
computers lacked operating systems and it usually turned out
that the programmer was also the operator of the system.
CRef. 4: p. 21 With the second generation (around
1960—1964) came technology based on solid state components
(transistors), batch processing, system operators, and
12

operating system software in the form of a collection of
system routines.
Computer security for the first and second generation
computers was not the problem it is today because they were
basically one-user—at-a—time systems. In both cases. if
sensitive material was processed, the computer facility was
physically secured and the computer was run in a "system
high" security mode. In the case of the second generation
computer jobs classified lower than the system high had
their output manually reviewed and downgraded to its proper
level of sensitivity.
With IBM's introduction of its 360 system in 1964, the
third generation was ushered in with new technology and
design philosophies. The technology of the third generation
has centered on solid state circuitry (integrated circuits),
allowing vast improvements over first and second generation
computers in the areas of speed, reliability, capacity,
versatility, and cost. In order to meet the growing and
varied demand for computers, many manufacturers began to
design and market series of general purpose computers.
CRef. 5: pp. 14-163
Probably the most significant change in computer system
design was the implementation of resource sharing. Even
before the advent of the third generation, it was apparent
that a job running singularly in the computer from start
until finish often wasted valuable computer resources
13

waiting -for input /output from the slower peripheral devices,
requiring only a small portion of system peripherals, and/or
occupying a limited section of core memory. Emerging in
such forms as multiprogramming, timesharing, and
multiprocessing, resource sharing provided am initial
solution to the problem by more efficiently and economically
distributing the computer's resources among a group of
simultaneous users. CRef. 6: p. >;il
Some people argue that a fourth generation of computers
exists currently. There is no general agreement on what
differentiates the fourth generation from the third
generation, but some of the proposed characteristics of
fourth generation computers a<re widespread simultaneous
interactive computing by multiple users, virtual processing
to get the maximum number of user processes into main memory
in order to maximize response time to user requests
CRef. 5: pp. 32-333, and Large Scale Integration
technology. In general it can be said that the above fourth
generation characteristics have expanded the resource
sharing capabilities of computers while at the same time
lowering the costs. Whether a fourth generation exists or
not, there has been an explosion in the usage of resource
sharing computers.
The more efficient use of computers through resource
sharing has not been without an associated cost. Under
resource sharing, the overall complexity of the computer
14

system increased. The complexity of the security problem
also increased. With multiple simultaneous resident user
processes, it rapidly became evident that there was a strong
need to protect a user from the actions o-f other users.
CRef. 7: pp. B-91 This included unintentional actions as
well as intentional ones.
Recognizing that a security problem existed was easy,
but deciding how to handle the problem was much harder. One
possible way to attack the problem is to avoid internal
controls through the use of a various computer processing
modes. Roger Schel 1 CRef. 2: p. 253 points out three
typical computer processing modes employed to avoid the use
of internal controls. In the first mode, each level of
classified data is processed on a separate computer
dedicated to processing that particular level o-f classified
data. All users of a given computer are cleared for the
level of classified processing and are authorised access to
all data on the system. This is appealing for real-time and
on-line systems, but it can cause duplication or inefficient
use of computers. Duplication may exist if more than one
classification is processed since a separate computer is
needed for each level of classification. Inefficient use
may occur if very little processing is done at a given
classification level, thus causing underuti 1 ization of the
computer's resources. A second mode involves scheduling
periods of processing so that during any given period, only
15

one level o-f classified data is processed. With this
approach, all of system memory must be purged between
processing. All users during a given period are cleared -for
the given level of classi-fied processing and are authorized
access to all data processed during that period. This
approach lacks responsiveness and causes the waste o-f
computer resources during period switching. In the third
mode, different classification levels are processed
simultaneously. All communication lines are secured and all
users are required to be authorized access to all the data.
All output from the system is initially classified at the
highest level and manually reviewed for downgrading as
necessary. This mode is often ref erred to as "System High".
CRef. 2: p. .253
Although these approaches enhance the security, they are
costly in many ways. There are added financial costs due to
increased communication security measures, manual review of
output, increased and/or more intensive security clearance
investigations (especially for the third approach), and
duplicate equipment. Another cost is the increased risk due
to expanded exposure of classified data (no way to enforce
compartmental i zation of data), increased possibility of
granting an untrustworthy person a clearance (due to greater
number of people requiring clearances) , and the error prone
tendency of manual review of output for downgrading.
Another cost is foregone capabilities such as rapid access
16

to information stored on the computer, efficient use of the
computer, and the establishment of computer networks which
serve a diverse and geographically separated user
community. CRef. 2: pp. 25-263 The sum effect of these
costs is a reduced level in the qualitative force factors
noted earlier.
Even with the methods noted above, there were obvious
shortcomings to the noted processing modes. Without
internal controls, the security of resource sharing
computers can certainly be enhanced, but the resource
sharing security issues are not really addressed. Without
internal controls, there is no reliable way to protect a
given user against the actions of other users. With respect
to the handling of classified data, there is the strong need
to be able to restrict access to portions of data on a
system to a select group of users even though all the users
may be cleared for the data. With only the methods noted
above, this is an impossibility on resource sharing
computers.
In 1967, a special Task Force was organized under the
auspices of the Defense Science Board to address the
safeguards necessary to adequately protect sensitive
information processed on remote access resource sharing
computers. In its 1970 report, "Security Controls for
Computer Systems" , the task force presented a number of
policy and technical recommendations aimed at reducing the
17

threat o-f compromise of sensitive information processed on
such systems. In 1972, the DoD defined a mode which would
address the protection problems of remote accessed resource
sharing computers. CRef. S: p. 11 This mode is the
multilevel security mode and is defined in the DoD ADP
Security manual DoD 5200. 2S-M as follows:
A mode of operation under an operating system (supervisor
or executive program) which provides a capability
permitting various levels and categories or compartments
of material to be concurrently stored or processed in an
ADP System. In a remotely accessed resource-sharing
system, the material can be selectively accessed and
manipulated from variously controlled terminals by
personnel having different security clearances and access
approvals. This mode of operation can accommodate the
concurrent processing and storage of (a) two or more
levels of classified data, or (b) one or more levels of
classified data with unclassified data depending upon the
constraints placed on the systems by the Designated
Approving Authority (Section V. C. , DoD Directive
5200.28). CRef. 9: p. 113
In order to fully comprehend its impact upon the security
issues of resource sharing computers, one also has to
understand the general clearance and access controls as
stated in the same manual.
Personnel who develop, test(debug), maintain, or use
programs which are classified or which will be used to
access or develop classified material shall have a
personnel security clearance and access authorization
(need—to—know) , as appropriate for the highest classified
and most restrictive category of classified material which
they will access under system constraints.
CRef. 9: p. 14J
There are several conditions important to the concept o-f
multilevel security. First the system must provide for the
concurrent processing of two or more levels of classified
13

data or one or more levels of classified data with
unclassified data. This differs from the dedicated and
period oriented computer processing modes noted earlier.
Secondly, the system should accommodate access to the
computer by personnel having different security clearances
and access approvals. This is not covered by any of the
mentioned processing modes. Finally, a user must have
authorization for the particular data he accesses. In the
classified sense, this equates to a need—to—know, but in
multilevel secure processing, it has also come to
incorporate authorization to perform functions on a
computer. As an example, a user must be authorized write
access to write to a file. This will be the attitude taken
in this thesis. In the broad sense, this is the control
aimed at isolating a given user from the actions of the
other users.
C. PAST DEVELOPMENTS IN REFINING MULTILEVEL SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS
In 1977 the DoD Computer Security Initiative was
established under the auspices of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering CRef. S: p. 11. The
Initiative was aimed at establishing the availability of
trusted computer systems. A trusted computer system is "one
that employs sufficient hardware and software integrity
measures to allow its use for simultaneously processing
multiple levels of classified and/or sensitive
19

information". CRef. 7: p. 13 In January 19S1, the DoD
Computer Security Center (CSC) was formed to expand on the
work already started by the Initiative.
One of the earliest undertakings o-f the DoD CSC was the
formalization of evaluation criteria through which the DoD
could judge the effectiveness of the security employed by
its computers. During the formalization, the CSC identified
six fundamental requirements that must be met by a computer
system in order for that system to be called secure. These
are as follow:
Requirement 1 - SECURITY POLICY - There must be an
explicit and well-defined security policy enforced by the
system.
Requirement 2 - MARKING - Access control labels must be
associated with objects [Passive entities that contain or
receive dataJ.
Requirement 3 - IDENTIFICATION - Individual subjects
[users, processes, or devices] must be identified.
Requirement 4 - ACCOUNTABILITY - Audit information must be
selectively kept and protected so that actions affecting
security can be traced to the responsible party.
Requirement 5 - ASSURANCE - The secure computer system
must contain hardware/software mechanism that can be
independently evaluated to provide sufficient assurance
that it enforces the basic requirements.
Requirement 6 - CONTINUOUS PROTECTION - The trusted
mechanisms that enforce these basic requirements must be
continuously protected against tampering and/or
unauthorized changes. CRef. 8: pp. 3-43
The CSC points out in its "Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria" Final Draft, that these requirements
are derived from the need to satisfy basic control

objectives which deal with Security Policy, Accountability,
and Assurance. In general a control objective "refers id a
statement of intent with respect to control over some aspect
of an organization's resources, or processes, or both. In
terms of a computer system, control objectives provide a
framework for developing a strategy for fulfilling a set of
security requirements for a given system." As such, they
are a "useful method of formalizing security goals".
CRef. 8: p. 55U In order to understand the implication of
the aforementioned requirements, one has to understand the
control objectives from which they are derived.
Computer security, in general, is concerned with
controlling access to and manipulation of the data processed
on the computer. The degree of protection required for a
given computer must be. based upon the perceived threats,
risks, and goals of the owner organization. A security
policy is a statement formalizing the requisite protection.
More concisely, the Security Policy Control Objective is:
A statement of intent with regard to control over access
to and dissemination of information, to be known as the
security policy, must be precisely defined and implemented
for each system that is used to process sensitive
information. The security policy must accurately reflect
the laws, regulation, and general policies from which it
is derived. CRef. 8: p. 55U
Without a stated security policy, there is no measure




Both the Security Policy and Marking requirements are
derived -from the Security Policy control objectives ^rea.
The control objectives of the Security Policy requirement
may be broken down into two subsets. The first subset of
control objectives deal with mandatory security controls.
Security policies defined for systems that are used to
process classified or other specifically categorized
sensitive information must include provisions for the
enforcement of mandatary access control rules. That is,
they must include a set of rules for controlling access
based directly on a comparison of the indi vi dual s 's
clearance ar authorization for the information and the
classification or sensitivity designation of the
information being sought, and indirectly on considerations
of physical and other environmental factors of control.
The mandatory access control rules must accurately reflect
the laws, regulations, and general policies from which
they are derived. CRef. 8: p. 56
J
Such controls are mandated by established rules that detail
how classified or sensitive information is to be handled.
Access is restricted in accordance with the
clearance/authorization of the user, the
classification/sensitivity of the data, and the type of
access being attempted.
The second subset of Security Policy control objectives
deal with discretionary security policies. The objectives
of this subset arei
Security policies defined for systems that are used to
process classified or other sensitive information must
include provisions for the enforcement of discretionary
access control rules. That is, they must include a
consistent set of rules for controlling and limiting
access based on identified individuals who have been
determined to have a need-to-know for the information.
CRef. 3: pp. 56-573

Discretionary security differs -from mandatory security in
that discretionary security is based upon the user
specifying the modes of access other users may have to
information under his/her control. Discretionary security
therefore mediates a users ability to access based on
his/her need—to—know that information. As indicated in the
previous section, none of the forms of dedicated mode of
operation afforded this type of security.
Implicit in a mandatory security policy is the concept
that the classification/sensitivity of information should be
clearly marked and that such markings should only be
alterable by those users who are properly authorized to do
so. These goals are clearly outlined in the Marking Control
Objectives:
Systems that are designed to enforce a mandatory security
policy must store and preserve the integrity of
classification or other sensitivity labels for all
information. Labels exported from the system must be
Accurate representations of the internal sensitivity
labels being exported. CRef. 8: pp. 57—583
Aside from allowing mandatory security controls to be
effective, a side benefit of marking is that all forms of
output may be accurately marked.
The Identification and Accountability requirements are
derived from the Accountability Control Objectives. These
objectives are concerned with individual accountability and
are as -follows:
Systems that are used to process or handle classified or
other sensitive information must assure individual
k'o

accountability whenever either a mandator^ or
discretionary security policy is invoked. Furthermore, to
assure accountability the capability must exist for an
authorized and competent agent to access and evaluate
accountability information by a secure means, within a
reasonable amount o-f time, and without undue di f f i cul ty.
CRef. S: pp. 57-593
Each access to the system and information on the system must
be controlled based on who is performing the access and what
information they are allowed to access. The identification
and authentication of users are, therefore, essential to
access control. A related problem on many systems today is
a weak accounting system. In many cases, a user may perform
a number of functions on a computer with reasonable
certainty that there will be no way to determine, after the
fact, what he/she did- In order for a system to be deemed
secure, it is absolutely necessary that each user be held
accountable for his/her actions. Therefore the system must
maintain selective accounting information that will allow
the proper authorities determine accountabi 1 i tv.
ERef. S: p. 4D
The last two requirements. Assurance and Continuous
Protection, Are derived from the Assurance Control
Objectives. These are:
Systems that are used to process or handle classified or
other sensitive information must be designed to guarantee
correct and accurate interpretation of the security policy
and must not distort the intent of the policy. Assurance
must be provided that correct implementation and operation
of the policy exists throughout the systems s life-cycle.
CRef. 8: p. 60 3
The mechanisms to accomplish the security policy, marking,
identification, and accountability controls are often
24

embedded in the operating system of the computer. Assurance
is necessary to guarantee or provide a degree o-f confidence
that these mechanisms do indeed provide the control that
they are intended to and that the mechanisms perform only
their intended functions. The general category of assurance
can be broken down into two parts. The first, life-cycle
assurance, deals with those measures taken by an
organization to ensure that the system is designed,
developed, and maintained utilising rigorous and formalised
standards and control. During the design, development, and
following any changes which may affect the above control
mechanisms, the system must be reevaluated to ensure the
control objectives are still being met. The second
assurance, continuous protection, is concerned with
guaranteeing that the security policy is uncircumventabl
y
enforced while the system is operating. To this extent, it
must be ascertained that there are neither holes through
which a user can avoid controls nor avenues that a user can
take to alter the control mechanisms. Some of the common
measures to accomplish this are isolation of protection
mechanism software, testing for the correct operation of
operational hardware and software, and hardware and software
encapsulation. CRef. 8; p. 593
D. FORMAL MODELS
In the last section, we saw that under the assurance of
protection requirement, the system must be designed to
25

guarantee correct and accurate interpretation o-f the
security policy. To show that a design does guarantee such
an interpretation is not a trivial process- First. the
designers must have a clear definition o-f the security
policy that they are to implement. Although the
aforementioned DoD regulations do define the requirements
for multilevel security, their English language formulation
is not adequate for conclusively demonstrating the
correctness and completeness of a security policy
implementation. Therefore, most designers rely on formal
models to unambiguously describe the security policy being
implemented, while at the same time providing a -foundation
that will allow the implementation to be proved correct and
accurate. CRef. 10: pp. 247-2483
The process of proving the implementation to be correct
is known as verification. To do this, the verifier must
show the consistency of an implementation with respect to
some specification of behavior expected of the
implementation. For security, the formal model specifies
the behavior expected to be exhibited by the implementation
of the security relevant portions of the system. To show
consistency between the model and implementation, the
verifier often relies on a mathematical proof.
CRef. 11: pp. 1-53 For all but the most minor piece of
code, verification can be a long and tedious process even
for those well versed in the process. Although verification
26

is an important aspect of any multilevel secure svstem, it
is beyond the scope o-f this thesis. Since a formai model
will be used to guide the design o-f the security features o-f
this system, verification may very well be an appropriate
follow—on topic for a future thesis.
Several formal models exist, but one of the best known
is probably the Bel 1 -LaPadul a Model. It has been used as a
model for such security related projects as the Kernalized
Secure Operating System for the PDP-11, security
enhancements to MULTICS for the Air Force Data Services
Center, and the SIGMA message system used in the Military
Message Experiment. The complete statement of the model is
quite lengthy and complex. It can, however, be summed up in
two properties as follow:
1. the simple security property: no subject has read
access to any object that has a classification greater
than the clearance of the subject; and
2. the *—property (pronounced "star property"): no
subject has append-access to an object whose security
level is not at least the current security level of
the subject; no subject has read—write access to an
object whose security level is not equal to the
current security level of the subject; and no subject
has read access to an object whose security level is
not at most the current security level of the subject-
In simpler terms, the first property says the user must have
a clearance greater than or equal to the classification of
the data he/she is attempting to read. The second property
has come to be identified with the prohibition of "writing
down". In other words, the user can not write a data object
to a second data object which has a lower classification
27

than the -First. CRef. 10: pp. 260-2613 This prevents the
user from lowering the classification o-f a given piece c-f
data.
This is gross simplification of the model since it is
based on finite state machines and has specific rules for
going from one state to the next. It does, however, provide
a flavor for the model. It should be mentioned that
included in the model are provisions for "trusted
subjects". A trusted subject is one which is allowed to
operate without being held to the restrictions of the
-property. These subjects can be trusted never to mix data
of different classifications. CRef. 12: p. 651
Use of this model has uncovered certain problems
associated with the model. The model has proved to be
overly restrictive with respect to its representation of
military security. Although it accommodates the hierarchy
of classification, it does not provide for objects which
contain multiple levels of classification. A typical
message in a military message system is composed of one or
more paragraphs, each of which has its own classification.
Under the Bel 1—LaPadula model, the message as an object can
only have one classification. In such a situation, the
message can be accessed only as a whole with regard to its
overall classification. Individual paragraphs would not be
accessible individually based on their own classification.
CRef. 10: pp. 262-2631
23

Except under the trusted subject concept, some of the
typical -functions of security, such as reclassification,
sani tization , and downgrading, are not allowed. The problem
here is that there is little guidance on what processes can
be trusted. Other problems identified include the
possibility of timing channels permitting the exchange of
information CRef. 10: pp. 262-263J and the lack of
structure to support application-dependent security rules.
As an example of an application-dependent security rule, one
observes in a message system, the need to restrict the
release operation to those users authorized to do so.
CRef. 12: pp. 66-67 3
Due to the special needs for message system security,
work is currently underway at the Naval Research Laboratory
(NRL) to develop a model which incorporates the application
specific security rules of message systems. The development
of this model is part of the Navy's Military Message System
(MMS) Project which has as one of its goals the development
of a family of multilevel secure message systems. Instead
presenting the specifics of the model here, an excerpt
describing the model can be found in Appendix A.
The MMS model overcomes some of the aforementioned
problems and gives security guidance in other areas as
well. With the MMS model, the classification of data items
may be reduced under certain circumstances, security rules
applicable to message processing are incorporated, and
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multilevel objects are included. Within the multilevel
object concept, the model differentiates between objects
(called atoms), which are single level, and containers,
which may be multilevel. An atom is the smallest unit of
data to which a classification can be attached. The
container has a classification of its own and may be made up
of atoms (each with its own classification) and/or other
containers. An important concept associated with containers
is "container clearance required" (CCR) . This is an attempt
to deal with the aggregation security problem by allowing a
minimum clearance requirement for access to the container
when necessary.
The model provides for an access set to be associated
with each atom and container. The access set consists of a
set of pairs, where each pair consists of a user ID and an
operation that the respective user can employ on the given
atom or container. Provision is also made to define user
roles such as releaser, downgrader, and system security
officer. It is even possible for a role designator to take
the place of a user ID in an access set pair.
CRef. 12: pp. 68-692
Since this model is tailored to a military message
system and the target electronic mail system of this thesis
incorporates many of the traits of a military message
system, the MMS model is used to guide the design of the
security features outlined in this thesis. The model will
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be adhered to as closely as possible; however, in some
instances deviations may occur. As an example, access sets
will be assigned to messages. Messages, however, can be
(and more than likely will be) containers since they will
contain paragraphs as referable objects. No attempt will be
made to assign access sets to these paragraphs. It is the







In this chapter, we will discuss previous work related
to the underlying Integrated Software System(ISS),
multilevel security, and security as related to the use of
the relational database model. In section B, the
development of the underlying -features o-f the ISS is
discussed along with the reasons that its electronic mail
function was chosen as the basis -for this thesis. In
section C, the SIGMA message system as a multilevel secure
message system is examined. Section D reviews Multisafe for
its modular approach to security. Finally, in section E
general database management system security mechanisms are
discussed.
B. THE INTEGRATED SOFTWARE SYSTEM
Almost anyone who has been working with computer systems
for any length of time has experienced delays due to the
learning curve associated with each individual application
of a given system, the frustration incurred by trying to
keep straight in his/her mind the application specific
commands as he/she switches back and forth between
applications, or the inability to use files created by one
application as input to another application. This is due
primarily to the lack of integration among applications. As
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the use of workstations spreads, the problems associated
with the lack of integration becomes intolerable. The aim
of the 1SS is to provide a degree of uniformity to the
workstation environment through the integration of five
common applications. The five applications chosen were text
processing, form generation, database management, electronic
mail, and spread sheet modeling.
Integration is provided by a single conceptual model for
the system as a whole and a set of basic commands common to
all five applications. This is not to say that there are no
application specific operations or commands. What is
intended here is a set of -five separate applications which
share a common intersection of operations, commands, and
data structures.
For the ISS, the relational database model is used as
the single underlying conceptual model. The underlying data
object is the relation. Although a relation may be
described mathematically in terms of a subset of the
Cartesian product of a list of domains CRef. 13: p. 193,
conceptually it can be viewed as a table. This is how it is
viewed and implemented in the ISS. Thus, the table, where
the tuples are rows and attributes Are column headings, is
the primary data object underlying all -five applications of
the ISS.
With the selection of the relational database model as
the single conceptual model and the table as the primary

data object, each application is then viewed as a logical
database consisting of a set o-f tables. Further integration
is accomplished by dividing each application's set of tables
into three generic subsets or classes: Application Directory
Table, Data Table Schema Table, and Data Tables. Each table
has key values which allow the unique identification of each
row. Any datum in a table can be accessed by specifying the
name of the table, the value of the key, and the name of the
attribute containing the datum.
The Application Directory Table of a given application
contains descriptive and definitional information about the
data tables of that application. Each row of the
Application Directory Table describes a data table for the
given application. A standard schema defines the rows of
the directory table, but allows the Application Directory
Table to be augmented to accommodate additional data table
attributes.
A data table represents the logical file of an
application. Much like data elements of modern programming
languages, d-^ta tables are typed. The type associated with
a table is based upon its primary use (i.e., text, form
text, database, spread sheet, or mail). Since a primary
objective of the ISS is the sharing of data among
applications, strong typing is not enforced. Typing is used
to categorize data tables in order to logically organize
those which are used primarily by the same application.
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The Data Table Schema Table defines the structure of the
data table, containing a row for each column in the data
table. Each row in the Application Directory Table is
linked to the Data Table Schema Table and the corresponding
data table. The same relationship among the tabies exists
for each application. Except for the database application,
all tables of a given application have the same structure.
Use of a common conceptual model (relational database
model) and data object (table) lead to a kernel of operators
and their associated operations common to all five
applications. Eight primitive operators common to all five
applications were defined for the ISS. These operators and
their associated operations are as follow:
i. Insert: changes a target table by inserting into it a
table at a specified location (ID value) or at the ena
by default.
2. Modify: alters a target table by changing the values
of specified columns in a row or set o-f rows to new
values. Row selection is determined by condition
satisfaction.
3. Delete: changes target table by deleting all rows
which satisfy a given condition.
4. Project: lists those columns specified, in the order
that they were specified.
5. Select: creates a new data table from all rows of a
given table which satisfy a given condition.
6. Union: creates a table consisting of the union of the
specified tables. If the tables are dissimilar, the
prescribed dominant table determines the structure of
the resultant table.
7. Sort: creates a new table which has the same
structure and data of the specified table, but is
sorted on the specified columns.
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S. Concatenate: creates a new text data table -from any
other type o-f table. The values o-f specified columns
of the operand table are concatenated into a single
resultant table, row by row, with each field in a row
of the given operand table separated from the next bv
a space in the corresponding resultant table row.
Taken together, the single conceptual model, the table as
the primary data object, and the basic set of common
primitive operations present a relatively high degree of
integration among the five application areas.
The thesis at hand, however, does not deal per se with
ISS as a whole. Rather, it is tailored to developing the
conceptual design of those features which would make the
electronic mail application of the ISS multilevel secure.
Future chapters will deal primarily with the electronic mail
application as if it were a stand—alone application.
The question which quickly arises is "Why choose an
electronic mail application which is designed as a part of
an integrated system?" There are at least four valid
reasons for doing so. First, the design for the system
exists. By using an electronic mail system with an existing
framework, more time can be devoted to the design of the
appropriate security features. Second, the conceptual
framework of the application exists without the specifics of
implementation. The author is therefore not constrained by
implementation limitations during the design of the security
features. As a result, the security features can become an
integral part of the overall conceptual design for the
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application, rather than an add—on -feature. Third, this
particular electronic mail application is based upon the
relational database mode. This increases ease of
understandabi 1 i ty and -facilitates certain security -features
as will be described in later chapters. Finally, although
it is not a major -factor o-f this thesis, it is hoped that
the security -features designed for the electronic mail
application will be general enough to allow the
incorporation of one or more of the other applications, thus
broadening the usefulness of the system. In any case, this
last point is left for future study.
C. SIGMA AS A SECURE MESSAGE SYSTEM
Since I960 much of the military message processing has
been automated in what appears to be three stages. The
first stage of automation emerged during the 1960 's with the
advent of communication networks, such as the Automatic
Digital Network (AUTQDIN) , for transferring formal messages
between military organizations. In the early 1970 's, the
second stage saw the introduction of telecommunication
center message systems such as the Local Digital Message
Exchange (LDMX) . The purpose of these systems was to
automate some of the message processing tasks. Error
checking and statistics gathering aire examples of the types
of tasks automated by the second stage systems. The final
and current stage was started recently with systems like the
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National Military Intelligence Center Support System
(NMIC-SS) and SIGMA. These systems are characterized as
user -oriented message systems because they provide direct
aid to the drafters and recipients of messages
CRef. 14: pp. 1648-16492.
In terms of security, many of the DoD message systems
are designed to operate in the System High Mode. Few,
however, have been designed to operate in a Multilevel
Security Mode. One such system, though, is SIGMA.
CRef. 15: p. 33
SIGMA was developed as an experimental system in
conjunction with a joint experiment (Military Message
Experiment) by the Navy, Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) and CINPAC to demonstrate and assess the
utility of an interactive message handling system to
operational military users. During the experiment SIGMA was
used by approximately 100 officers in the Operations
Directorate and the command center o-f the
Commander-in-Chief, Faci-fia (CINPAC). It was connected to an
LDMX, allowing the users to send and receive formal messages
over AUTODIN. SIGMA also supported informal messages and a
class of messages know as formal memoranda. This latter
class was composed of on-the-record messages between the
SIGMA users.
Many features were incorporated into SIGMA in order to
make it highly useful for military applications. Like many

other interactive message systems, it supported the delivery
and display of incoming messages, composition and
transmission o-f outgoing messages, and storage and retrieval
of messages. SIGMA also provided computer aided
distribution of messages. In order to accommodate the
desire of the CINPAC Operations Directorate not to have full
automatic distribution, SIGMA presented all messages for the
Directorate to a special user who reviewed the message and
determined the appropriate distribution within the
Directorate. Some of the other useful features included
on-line action logs and readboards, computer-based message
coordination, automation of the release function, message
archival, and message retrieval from archival storage.
Even though SIGMA was implemented on a non-secure
operating system (TENEX) , its user interface was designed as
if it were running on a multilevel secure kernel. This was
done so that the interface would remain unchanged if SIGMA
were ever implemented on a secure operating system. SIGMA 's
secure interface includes a multilevel user terminal. Some
of the features of the terminal include the division of the
terminal screen into windows, each acting as a logically
independent terminal; two sets of security lights to
indicate respectively the highest classification being
displayed on the terminal and the classification of the
window where the cursor is located; and special function




It was envisioned that the security kernel which the
interface would run on would implement the Bel 1—LaPadui
a
security model. To this extent, a trusted process facility
was included in the interface. It was discovered, however,
that requiring SISMA to enforce the Bel 1 -LaPadui a model
presented several problems.
First, military message systems must be able to operate
on multilevel objects such as messages and message files.
As noted in Chapter 2, the Bel 1 -LaPadui a model does not
support multilevel objects. Second, while downgrading is a
common operation required by message system users, it is
prohibited by the Bel 1 -LaPadui a model. Third, message
system security requires certain application specific rules
(e.g., message release), yet the Bel 1 —LaPadui a model has no
provision for handling these rules.
Without a multilevel object capability, SIGMA users are
forced to perform a downgrading operation where one should
not be required. An example of this occurs when a user
extracts a confidential paragraph from a secret document.
Since the Bel 1 -LaPadui a model requires the secret
classification to be carried forward with the extracted
paragraph, the user faces working with an incorrectly
classified paragraph or invoking the downgrading procedure.
To do this the user must copy the paragraph to a new
document with a classification of secret and then invoke the
downgrade operation on the new document to lower the
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classification to confidential. Downgrading, the second
problem, is performed by a trusted process which can, under
certain circumstances, violate the Bel 1-LaPadul a model. To
handle SIGMA 's third problem, software was develoced to
perform the required checks. This software, however, is
external to both the kernel and the trusted process.
CRef. 14: pp. 3-4 3
It is in light of such problems and their related
patches that the Military Message System's security model is
being developed. CRef. 15: p. 11 It is tailored for the
needs of a message system and, therefore, designed to
overcome the problems noted here. For this reason, it has
been chosen to guide the development of the security
measures presented in this thesis.
D. MULT I SAFE: A MODULAR APPROACH TO SECURITY
In the development of most software systems, the
modularization of the system is of major issue. When
developing a secure software system, the issue of
modularization becomes extremely important. The reason for
this evolves from the assurance and continuous protection
requirements discussed in Chapter 2.
The basic underlying concept o-f these requirements is
that there must be some way to guarantee that the securitv
mechanisms do indeed provide the protection dictated by the
given security policy; that they perform only their intended
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functions; and that the mechanisms provide uncircumven table,
continuous protection. For secure systems, such a guarantee
usually means verification of the implementation with
respect to a security model as noted in Chapter 2. Even
under the best o-f conditions, verification is a long,
tedious, and difficult process. If, however, the security
mechanisms are distributed throughout the system,
verification becomes virtually impossible. The design,
therefore, must provide the most favorable conditions for
establishing the above guarantee.
One of the current philosophies oriented to establishing
favorable conditions for verification centers around the
concept of encapsulation. Under the concept of
encapsulation, a section of a given system is
circumscribed. Access to the circumscribed section can only
be made via prescribed paths and all accesses are
control led.
The mechanism providing the encapsulation is often
viewed as a reference validation monitor because its job is
to mediate all references (accesses) to the circumscribed
section. Such a reference validation mechanism has three
basic properties.
1. It must be tamperproof
.
2. It must always be invoked.
3. It must be small enough to be subjected to analysis
and tests, the completion of which can be assured.
CRef. 12: p. 713
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In essence, the reference validation mechanisms are also
circumscri bed.
Needless to say, modularization plays a key role in the
circumscription of the desired section and the development
of the reference validation mechanism. All the functions of
the circumscribed section must be defined. isolated, and
incorporated into the overall module to be circumscribed.
All interfaces to the module must be clearly defined and it
must be assured that no alternative paths (interfaces) into
the module exist.
A similar process occurs with the reference validation
mechanism. All of its functions must be clearly defined,
isolated, and incorporated into the reference validation
module. As mentioned earlier, the role of the reference
validation mechanism is to mediate accesses to the
circumscribed module. It, therefore, logically sits between
the users and the circumscribed section, filtering the
users' accesses to the circumscribed section. Since the
reference validation mechanisms, in essence, will provide
the multilevel security of the system through its mediation
of accesses, it will have to undergo verification. It
should, therefore, be kept as small as possible, and only
necessary functions should be incorporated in it.
This is the type of approach taken by the MULTISAFE
system. MULTISAFE is a MULTImodule system for supporting
Secure Authorization with Full Enforcement -for database
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management. As the break-out of its name would indicate, it
is designed to provide securely controlled database access
and it is the claim of its authors that it is designed:
1. to be verifiably secure,
2. not to incur a prohibitive performance penalty,
3- to produce a modular system in accordance with the
structured approach to design,
4. to be naturally extendible to the protection of
distributed data, and
5. to provide mechanisms flexible enough to adhere to
complex protection policies. CRef. 16: p. 3823
The MULTISAFE design centers around the division of the
data management system into three functionally separate
modules: the user application module <UAM) , the data storage
and retrieval module <SRM> , and the protection and security
module (PSM). All three modules are designed to function in
a concurrent fashion and are treated as separate and
isolated processes. Although the modules are logically
separate, the modules may or may not be physically
separate. Physical separation is not critical to the
security of the system but does enhance performance due to
actual concurrency of operations. CRef. 16: pp. 384—3853
With the separation of functions, the role of the PSM is
to perform only security checks (reference validation). As
a separate module, the PSM offers fine granularity and its
sophistication may vary to accommodate complex protection
policies. Three classes of access decisions are supported:
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data—independent , data-de-f ini t ion-dependent , and
data-value-dependent. Examples of data-independent access
control conditions are user and/or terminal identification,
time of day session initiated, and system status.
Data-definition-dependent conditions limit access based on
attributes (relation and attribute names) but not data
values. Data—value—dependent access controls are a function
of the values of attributes. As designed, the PSM performs
only discretionary access control. It, therefore, does not
enforce the mandatory access control necessary -for
multilevel security. CRef. 16: p. 3853
The UAM provides the interface between the user and the
system. It reads and analyzes user queries and formats and
displays results. Many of the functions traditionally
located in the operating system are executed within the UAM.
In a multiuser environment, the UAM may be viewed in a
number of ways. One view is as a conventional
mul ti programmed processor which has disjoint user address
spaces. An alternate method has at least part of the UAM
residing in each of the users' terminals. In the case of
intelligent terminals, each user's software and local data
buffers are physically separated from the other users.
The SRM resides on a separate processor. Its primary
jobs include database storage management and the performance
of database accesses for the PSM and UAM. Since it resides
on a separate processor, the SRM can compute such values as
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SUM, COUNT, and AVERAGE and perform special functions such
as JOIN, PROJECTION, and the establishment of views for a
relational database. In addition to its database functions,
the SRM maintains private application files and handles the
simple input /output operations for these files.
CRef. 16: p. 3863
As noted earlier, all interfaces to a circumscribed
section must be clearly defined. MULTISAFE has attacked
this problem by viewing the communications as going between
an unsensitive part (UAM) and a sensitive part <SRM) with a
gate (PSM) between them. With this in mind, it was decided
that all communications between modules would be handled via
messages. In order to assure all requests for SRM
information are mediated, the PSM controls the intermodule
communications. A general scenario of how a request is
fulfilled is as follows:
1. The UAM polls the terminals for user requests.
2. Once a user request is received, the UAM formats the
request into message format, tags the message with a
unique terminal identifier identifying the source, snd
places the message in the UAM's memory.
3. When the PSM is ready to process a new request, the
PSM notifies the UAM. Upon acknowledgement of a
request pending, the PSM retrieves the request from
the UAM's memory and writes it to the SRM ' s memory.
4. The PSM retrieves the appropriate authorization check
information from its database and starts the checking
process. If additional information is needed from the
user, the PSM sends a message to the UAM.




6. When the SRM is ready to send a block of data. it
notifies the PSM.
7. The PSM retrieves the data from the SRM ' s memory.
S. The PSM performs data dependent checks on the data.
9. If the access is authorized, then the PSM writes the
data to the UAM's memory and notifies the UAM.
10. The UAM then sends the result to the requesting user.
CRef. 16: pp. 399-4003
The security provided by MULTISAPE is based upon several
assumptions and definitions. The assumptions made are as
f ol 1 ow:
1. Physical access is controlled. Access to the system
is through terminals only.
2. PSM programming is impervious to modification. All of
the PSM software is implemented via ROM.
3. User identification is assumed to be correct.
4. Users are separated in the UAM. Primary memory
protection is provided by the UAM to prevent a user
from interfering with another user's processes, data,
and/or messages.
5. Security is limited in scope. Security is limited to
access controls and, therefore, does not incorporate
information flow controls or inference controls.
6. Only discretionary access controls are enforced.
With these underlying assumptions access and data security
can be defined. Access includes all operations which read,
write, or store data on the system. It also includes all
operations which set, alter, or display authorizations. The
data of a system is secure i-f the enforcement process only
allows those access authorizations specified by the
authorizer. MULTISAFE's data security may alternately be
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stated in terms of -four conditions- First, all
authorisations are properly stored in the PSM database.
Second, the PSM ' s access decisions are correct with respect
to the access request, authorization information stored in
the PSM's database, and the state of the system. Third, all
requests for access are mediated by the PSM. Fourth, data
may move between the user and the database only as a
response to an authorized access request.
CRef. 16: pp. 387-388J
Althouqh the MULTISAFE system does not enforce mandatory
security access controls, it does provide a good approach to
modularization of a secure system. Much of the
modularization approach will be used in the design of the
multilevel secure electronic mail application proposed in
this thesis. Modifications will be made to accommodate
mandatory access controls and other features incorporated by
this thesis.
E. GENERAL DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SECURITY MECHANISMS
Although multilevel security requirements exist within
the DoD, the security requirements of the typical database
management system (DBMS) users are generally less
stringent. Consequently there appear to be no of f-the-shel
f
multilevel secure systems available. This is not to say
that there are no security mechanisms incorporated in the




The concerns of the typical DBMS user center around two
types o-f database protection: integrity preservation and
security (access control). Integrity preservation is
oriented to preventing incorrect data from entering the data
base as a result of nonmal icious errors such as mistyping or
programming errors. The thesis at hand, however, is
interested in the access control aspect of database
protection. Therefore, a brief examination will be made of
some of the mechanisms and means available to DBMS users to
control access. It should be noted that not all DBMS '
s
incorporate the mechanisms which are to be examined.
Some DBMS's have the means to enforce varying degrees of
discretionary access control. One method, exhibited by
System R and Query-by-Exampl e (QBE) is the maintenance of
table—of -rights for users. A table-of -rights operates on
the same basic principle as the access sets of the MMS
security model described in Chapter 2. Such a table
specifies the capabilities of the listed users over given
information in the database. CRef. 13: p. 355D
Views may be used to limit access to a portion of the
database. The role of a view is to define a portion of the
conceptual database. In much the same way that a schema
defines the makeup of the conceptual database, a subschema
traditionally defines the view. Such a subschema includes
only those attributes of relations found in the desired
portion o-f the conceptual database. To the user controlled
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by a view, it appears as i-f the database is comprised only
of those parts de-fined by the view. Access control is
obtained by not incorporating attribute information of
protected values, thus not making them referable.
CRef. 17: p. 2263 A number of systems such as System R,
QBE, and IMS incorporate some sort of view mechanisms.
CRef. 13: p. 3563
Another means of controlling access to database
information is query modification. In query modification,
the system modifies queries with extra conditions which must
be met. The extra conditions filter out the sensitive
information. It should be noted that under both views and
query modification, some inefficiencies exist because
information is retrieved which is not passed on to the
users. CRef. 17: pp. 226-2273
By definition, a view defines a portion of the
conceptual database. In essence, query modification also
defines a portion of the conceptual database and is
therefore a means of establishing a view. The difference
between the view in the traditional sense and query
modification lies in the way the two ^re commonly
implemented. As noted, the view is generally established
through a subschema which acts as a template for what the
user can see. Unless the subschema is equivalent to the
schema for the whole conceptual database, the user typically
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sees only a subset of all the attributes o-f the whole
conceptual database.
Query modification can accomplish the same thing by
modifying a user's query to eliminate the attributes not
maintained in the view. The subtle difference is that in
query modification, the user can see the entire makeup of
the conceptual database, but is not allowed to retrieve
information from those attributes eliminated by the query
modification. Query modification does, however, has a
dynamic quality which lends itself to the task of multilevel
security. This dynamic quality is the elimination of all
values of given attribute which do not meet a predefined
condition. In the case of multilevel security, it is the
elimination of all information for which the classification
is not less than or equal to the clearance of the requesting
user.
In essence, mandatory access will be based on a
universal view mechanism built into the software. This
mechanism will be based on the concept of query modification
and as described above will filter out all information from




IV. TABLES AND ATTRIBUTES
A. INTRODUCTION
The tables and attributes necessary to support a
multilevel secure stand alone version of the ISS mail
application are defined in this chapter. Section B presents
an overview of the system of tables used by the mail
application. Section C discusses the Schema Table and the
role it plays in defining the composition of other tables.
The maintenance of user specific security information in the
Users Table and the need for bitmap translation tables is
shown in Section D. Section E describes the Mail Directory
Table and section F presents the Mail Data Table along with
the Body Table. Finally, the makeup and various aspects of
four security specific table types (Directory Table Access
Table, Mail Message Control Table, Access Control Table, and
Object Control Table) are covered in sections G through J.
It should be noted that the non-security related aspects
of the tables presented here are taken from Harrison and
Thompson's thesis CRef. 11 on the Integrated Software
System. Only very minor modifications are being made to
these aspects and will be noted when made. As noted
earlier, individual references to each item taken from their
thesis would be cumbersome and a general acknowledgement is
made instead. The security features presented here,
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however, are the subject o-f this thesis. An initial
presentation of the -features were presented in Harrison and
Thompson's thesis in preparation for this -follow—on thesis.
Since that presentation, some security features have been
changed, therefore causing discrepancies between the former
and current theses. With regard to the security features,
the current thesis should be the appropriate point of
reference.
B. OVERVIEW
Twelve table types are discussed in this chapter. Two
are used to hold the classified mail messages and the
remaining ten are used to enforce the access mediation
required by the Military Message Systems (MMS) security
model. Figure. 4.1 shows all twelve tables and the linkages
among them. A brief explanation of each is offered below:
1. Schema Table: provides information of the structure of
the tables that the system is working with.
2. Users Table: used during logon to authenticate user
and establish access clearance level.
3. Trans_role Table: used to translate user readable role
description into machine readable role description.
Like the Trans_compart and Trans_caveat Tables, the
Trans_role Table facilitates user friendliness. The
user inputs actual or mnemonic representation of roles
and the system obtains a bit-map representation from
the Trans_role Table.
4. Trans_compart Table: used to translate user readable
compartment description into a machine readable




5. Trans_caveat Table: used to translate user readable
caveat description into a machine readable
description. Promotes user -friendliness. See
Trans_role Table.
6. Mail Data Table: holds the header information of mail
messages and pointers to the associated Body Tables
which hold the text o-f the mail messages. There is a
separate Mail Data Table for each addressee in the
mail system. An addressee is an entity, such as a
user or project, which is authorized to receive mail.
7. Body Table: used to hold the text of a single mail
message. The text and its associated header
information form one mail message.
8. Mail Directory Table: used as a central directory to
locate individual Mail Data Tables. Contains pointers
to the Directory Table Access, Mail Message Control,
and Mail Data Tables. Provides the first layer of
control by providing minimum clearance, compartment,
and caveat requirements that a user must meet to
perform any access operation on the associated Mail
Data Table (to include sending mail to the addressee
represented by the Mail Data Table).
9. Directory Table Access Table: used to provide second
layer of access mediation by identifying those users
who are allowed access to the associated Mail Data
Table. There is one Directory Table Access Table for
each Mail Data Table on the system. Unless in the
access list, a given user will not be able to perform
any access operation on the associated Mail Data Table
(to include sending mail to the addressee represented
by the Mail Data Table).
10. Mail Message Control Table: provides the third layer
of access mediation by providing the minimum
clearance, compartment, and caveat requirements that a
user must meet in order to perform any access
operation on the associated mail message. There is a
row for each mail message in the Mail Data Table. It
also contains pointers to the Access Control and
Object Control Tables.
11. Access Control Table: provides the fourth layer access
mediation by identifying those users allowed access to
the associated mail message and the access operations
that they are allowed to perform.
12. Object Control Table: provides fifth layer of access
control by allowing mandatory access control over all

objects in the associated mail message. It holds the
classi -fication , compartments, and caveats associated



































Figure 4.1. Mail Application Table Types

As is indicated, access mediation is approached in a
layered fashion:
1. Authorized system usage is determined at logon using
the Users Table.
2. Access to general Mail Data Table information is
determined though the Mail Directory Table and
Directory Table Access Table.
3. Access to specific mail message information is
controlled by the Mail Message Control, Access
Control, and Object Control Tables.
The details of the tables are presented below. Their usage
for access mediation is discussed in more detail in chapter
5. Only three basic access operations Are envisioned for
this system: Read, Write, and Send. The functions performed
during these operations are discussed in chapter 5. Chapter
6 discusses how the user might use these access operations.
C. SCHEMA TABLE
As in the Harrison and Thompson thesis, the Schema Table
is discussed first so that its structure may be used to
describe subsequent tables. The Schema Table is a single
table containing one row (tuple) for each different
attribute found in the various tables of the mail
application. In general, the purpose of the Schema Table is
to provide information on the structure of the tables that
the system is working with. The columns (attribute) of the
Schema Table Are shown in Figure 4.2 and Are sel f —descr i bed
in Figure 4.3 by rows (tuples) from the Schema Table
itself. It should be noted that in the mail application
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presented here, all tables -follow a standard format. The
Schema Table and some other tables are discussed here not so
much for their usefulness to the subject of this thesis,
i.e. multilevel security, but for ease of cross reference
between the current and former thesis and the ease of
possible future incorporation of other ISS applications.
The ID column is a six digit field representing the
display order of the rows as a table and the conceptual
ordering of the rows in the database. This does not mean,
however, that the actual physical implementation of the
application must store the relation in this fashion. As a
whole, the attributes established in this chapter are not
meant to be fixed for implementation as described. They are
described in terms of fixed representations in order to
establish a foundation for the conceptual design and may
take entirely different forms when implemented. They
should, however, perform the same functions as indicated in
this thesis.
! ID ! NAME i TYPE ! WIDTH ,' SYNONYM ! TABLE I
Figure 4.2. Schema Table Schema
The ID column is incorporated into all tables in the
application and corresponds to the record numbers found in
such systems as DBMS II. In order to avoid redundancy, the
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ID column will not be redescribed in the description o-f
subsequent tables. It should be noted that since the column
names of a table represent the attributes of relations and
the rows of a table represent the tuples of a relation, the
paired terms will be used interchangeably in follow-on
descriptions.
ID NAME TYPE WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE
ID 1 INTEGER 6 OFFSET -ALL
NAME 1 CHAR 20 SCHEMA !
TYPE CHAR 8 SCHEMA !
WIDTH INTEGER 8 SCHEMA
SYNONYM CHAR SCHEMA
TABLE CHAR ' SCHEMA !
Figure 4.3. Self -describing Tuples of Schema Table
The NAME column is the textual name of the attribute
which appears in one or more tables of the application. The
physical data type and maximum size of data found in the
"NAME" column is described by TYPE and WIDTH columns. As a
convention "0" in the width column means "of varying
length". The SYNONYM column holds the names of other
columns in the system which have the same characteristics
(TYPE and WIDTH) and may hold data compatible with the
column being described. TABLE contains the name of a
particular table or type of table where the column being

described can be -found. By convention a simple literal
indicates a particular table, a "-" -followed by a literal
indicates all o-f a particular table type or class.
Since all the tables in the application follow fixed
formats, the Schema Table can be created entirely at system
generation. In Figure 4.3 we see those Schema Table tuples
which define the attributes o-f the Schema Table itself. As
an example of how the information of the Schema Table is
broken down we look at the first tuple which describes the
ID column. In this tuple we see that the ID column holds a
six digit integer value. The column OFFSET has the same
characteristics as the ID column. The ID column appears in
all of the tables found in the Application.
D. USERS TABLE AND BIT MAP TRANSLATION TABLES
The Users Table is used by the system to mediate initial
access to the system and establish the clearance level of
each user after he/she has logged onto the system. A
separate row is maintained for each authorized user of the
system. Since access mediation also involves the clearance
level of the terminal being used, this information can also
be stored in the Users Table. Access to the table is limited
to a user operating under the System Security Officer (SSO)
role (see Appendix A). The Users Table is shown in Figure
4.4 and the attributes are described by their corresponding
Schema Table tuples in Figure 4.5.

In the case where a user is being identified, USER_NAME
is the actual name of the user described by the tuples.
USER_ID is a unique alphanumeric string which the system
uses to represent the user. Since USER_ID is unique for
each individual user, it is not necessary that the user's
actual name be manipulated to make it unique. Far terminal
identification, USERJMAME and USER_ID may be used to
identify the terminal and/or computer port. AUTHENTIC is
the authentication information that must be supplied by the
user during log on in order to be granted access. AUTHENTIC
is not applicable to terminals. For purposes a-f
illustration only, it is assumed that a one-way encrypted
password is stored in the AUTHENTIC column. As with any of
the other fields, AUTHENTIC is only meant to conceptually
represent required information and is not meant to place
restrictions on actual implementation. In an actual
implementation, AUTHENTIC could be a pointer to a table
containing information required for a voice print
verification of the user.
i ID I USER NAME I USER ID ! AUTHENTIC ! CLEAR !
COMPART ! CAVEAT J ROLE !
Figure 4.4. Users Table schema
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CLEAR indicates the highest classification of data that
the user or terminal may receive. For the application at
hand, access mediation will be based on the maximum common
clearance level (to include clearance as well as
compartments and caveats) between the user and the terminal
he/she is operating from. Thus, the user will be granted
access to data classified less than or equal to the
classification indicated by the minimum of the user and
terminal CLEAR values. The standard DoD classification
hierarchy of UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and TOP
SECRET is assumed and, for the purposes of this thesis, Are
represented as U, C, S, and T. COMPART and CAVEAT indicate
respectively the compartments and caveats the user or
terminal is allowed to operate under. The common set of
compartments will be the intersection of the user's and
terminal's COMPART values and the common set of caveats will
be the intersection of the two CAVEAT values. It is
envisioned that COMPART and CAVEAT will be implemented via
bit maps where each "1" bit represents access under the
particular compartment or caveat represented by that
position. ROLE is also envisioned as a bit map and
indicates the roles the user can assume. Role is not
applicable to terminals. Bit maps have been chosen to
represent compartments, caveats, and roles because of the
possibility of multiple values in each case. For example, a
user may be authorized to operate under downgrader and SSO
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roles. Bit maps allow easy representations o-f multiple
values.
ID WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE
USERJMAME CHAR 20 USERS
USER_ID CHAR 10 OWNER
USER
USERS
AUTHENTIC CHAR 12 USERS




COMPART BOOLEAN 16 M_COMPART
0_COMPART
USERS
CAVEAT BOOLEAN 16 M_CAVEAT
0_CAVEAT
USERS
ROLE BOOLEAN 16 ! USERS
Figure 4.5. Schema Table rows for Users Table
The use o-f bit maps, however, does imply the need -for
translation -from a user readable representation to the bit
map and possibly vice versa. As might be expected, tables
are used for the translation. Figure 4.6 shows the common
schema used -for the Trans_role, Trans_compart , and
Trans_caveat Tables. The corresponding Schema Table rows are
given in Figure 4.7. USER_F0RM is the user readable




I ID I USER FORM SYS FORM
Figure 4.6. Trans_role, Trans_compart , and
Trans_caveat Tables' schema
Such tables would be created at system generation with
unalterable ID and SYS_FORMAT columns. The ID column is
numbered one—up to the number o-f bit positions in the bit
map. The SYS_FORMAT is all zeroes except in the bit
position corresponding to the associated ID value. Bit
positions ^re numbered one—up -from right to le-ft. The
USER_FORM may be modified by a user in the SSO role to
establish a user readable representation which will from
then on correspond to the SYS_FORM value. Therefore, when a
user readable representation is detected on input, the
system can establish the proper system readable
representation through the translation table. Once
translated, boolean operators could be used to derive
multiple values and for access checks.
SYNONYM TABLE








Figure 4.7. Schema Table rows for Trans_role,
Trans_compart , and Trans_caveat Tables
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As indicated, three such tables, Trans_role,
Trans_compar t , and Trans_caveat , would be needed to
translate roles, compartments, and caveats respectively.





Figure 4.8. Trans_role Table example
E. MAIL DIRECTORY TABLE
The role of the Mail Directory Table is to describe \ihe
Mail Data Tables. The Mail Directory Table has a row for
each logical Mail Data Table on the system and is used by
the system and the user to locate particular Mail Data
Tables. Figure 4.9 shows the attributes of the directory
table and Figure 4.10 presents the Schema Table rows
defining the Mail Directory Table attributes.
TABLE_NAME is a unique name for the Mail Data Table
described by the tuple and acts as a pointer to that Mail
Data Table. Since TABLE_NAME is the name for the Mail Data
Table of a particular addressee, it reflects the addressing
scheme used to deliver mail messages. For the purpose of
this application, an address is assumed to be an assigned
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unique name associated with an addressee. For example, mail
might be sent to the author by using the address RWYATT.
RWYATT would then be incorporated into the name of the Mail
Data Table -for the author. A possible name might be
Mail_Data_RWYATT. COLUMNS lists the column names -found in
the Mail Data Table. COLUMNS and the Schema Table sirs used
to completely describe the associated Mail Data Table. The
names of those fields which comprise the key for the Mail
Data Table Ars held in the KEY field. For the purposes of
this application, both the the date-time—group (DTG) and ID
fields will be used as the key fields. In particular, DTG
will be used for specific retrieval from storage. This
deviates somewhat from the Harrison and Thompson thesis
which states that ID will be the key field.
! ID ! TAELE_NAME ! COLUMNS ! KEYS I VIRTUAL ! CONDITION !
GLOBALS .' OWNER ! DESCRIPTION.' M CLEAR ! M COMPART !
M_CAVEAT ! DTAT ! MMCT
!
Figure 4.9. Mail Directory Table schema
VIRTUAL is a logical field indicating whether the Mail
Data Table is to be composed from other Mail Data Tables,
and if true, then CONDITION is a list of the tables that the
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virtual table is to be composed -from. In such a cas&, the
corresponding Mail Data Table does not exist on a permanent
basis. Instead it is created -from other Mail Data Tables
upon request and granting of access to the virtual Mail Data
Table.
ID NAME TYPE WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE
1 TABLE_NAME CHAR I 20 DIRECTORY !
COLUMNS CHAR DIRECTORY !
KEYS CHAR 8 DIRECTORY
VIRTUAL BOOLEAN 1 DIRECTORY !
i »
CONDITION CHAR DIRECTORY
GLOBALS CHAR DIRECTORY !
OWNER CHAR 10 USER ID
! USER
DIRECTORY
DESCRIPTION CHAR DIRECTORY i














DTAT CHAR 20 DIRECTORY !
MMCT CHAR 20 DIRECTORY i
Figure 4.10. Schema Table rows -for Mail Directory Table
The use of CONDITION here differs from that proposed by
Harrison and Thompson. In their thesis, CONDITION held the
66

series of operations necessary to generate the desired
virtual table. Due to the proposed modularization, this has
been changed to indicate the source Mail Data Tables only.
The result is that upon request of access to the virtual
table, the system will compose a temporary Mail Data Table
of those mail messages from the indicated source tables for
which the requesting user is authorised access.
GLQBALS is a text string which may contain data related
to formatting, display mode, or other parameters useful to
the system. OWNER is the user id of the designated
administrator of the associated Mail Data Table. DESCRIPTION
is a short narrative description of the Mail Data Table.
M_CLEAR, M_COMPART, and M_CAVEAT correspond to the
minimum clearance, minimum compartments, and minimum caveats
that a user must meet in order to read the corresponding
Mail Directory tuple and have access to the associated Mail
Data Table. A blank field for the M_CLEAR column and/or all
zeroes in M_COMPART or M_CAVEAT columns means there Ars no
minimum requirements for the corresponding categorv. DTAT
and MMCT hold unique names which point respectively to the
Data Table Access Table and Mail Message Control Table. The
Directory Table Access Table is an access list which
specifies those users authorized read access to the
corresponding Mail Directory tuple and access to the
associated Mail Data Table. The Mail Message Control Table
is used to enforce mandatory and discretionary control over
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individual mail messages found in the associated Mail Data
Table. The Directory Table Access Table and the Mail Message
Control Table are described in more detail in subsequent
sections of this chapter.
The tuples in the Mail Directory Table are created as a
coordinated effort between the System Administrator and the
System Security Officer in response to a user request for a
new Mail Data Table. The System Administrator collects the
required information from the user. After all the
information has been gathered, he/she allocates space for
the new Mail Data Table and turns the information over to
the SSO. Under the SSO role, a new tuple is created in the
Mail Directory Table. The non—security related fields are
filled in from the information provided by the System
Administrator. The DTAT and MMCT fields are filled in with
the corresponding table names. If the user requesting a
Mail Data Table desires, the M_CLEAR, M_COMPART, and
M_CAVEAT fields will be filled in as directed. Otherwise
they are filled in to indicate no minimum requirements. The
default of no minimum requirements is appropriate since a
newly created Mail Data Table would contain no classified
information. The indicated owner (or SSO role) may change
the minimum requirement fields at any time after the
corresponding Mail Data Table has been created. The other




F. MAIL DATA TABLE
The Mail Data Table is the actual repository of mail
messages. Each row in the Mail Data Table represents a
separate mail message. The schema of the Mail Data Table is
shown in Figure 4.11. Figure 4.12 presents the Schema Table
tuples which describe the Mail Data Tables.
,' ID .' VIEWED ! FROM ,' TO ! COPY TO ! DTG I
SUBJECT ! BODY !
Figure 4.11. Mail Data Table schema
The VIEWED attribute is a boolean value indicating
whether or not the message has been read by the
administrator o-f the mail data table. The header of the
mail message is made up o-f the FROM, TO, COPY_TO, DTG, and
SUBJECT attributes. FROM is filled in by the user but must
be a valid address -for delivering mail to a Mail Data Table
for which the user is the designated administrator (OWNER).
TO and COPY_TO are also filled in by the user and must be
valid addresses. SUBJECT is filled in by the user, but no
restrictions are placed on its contents.
The DTG (date time group) will be a system time stamp
which initially indicates when the message (tuple) was
created via a. write operation to the Mail Data Table or when
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the message was processed by a send instruction. The DTG of
a message processed by a send instruction is always
overwritten with the date-time-group at the time o-f the send
operation. The DTG of a send operation has a suffix of "S"
.
If the DTG is empty preceding a write operation, the DTG
will be filled in with the date-time-group associated with
the writing of the mail message tuple. In this case the DTG
will have a suffix of W. If the DTG is non-empty prior to
the write, the DTG will remain as it is. Thus the user may
preserve the previous DTG value or cause the generation of a
new one by blanking out the DTG -field prior to writing. The
assignment of the DTG as described above maintains the
uniqueness which it requires as a key attribute.
ID NAME TYPE WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE
VIEWED BOOLEAN 1 MAIL ;
FROM CHAR MAIL :
TO CHAR o : MAIL !
! COPY_TO CHAR o : MAIL :
! DTG I CHAR 20 : MAIL !
! SUBJECT CHAR o : MAIL !
! BODY ! CHAR 20 ! MA I L !
Figure 4.12. Schema Table rows for Mail Data Table
The attribute BODY holds the name of the Body Table
containing the text of the mail message. This is a slight
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deviation from that proposed by Harrison and Thompson. They
proposed that the body attribute holds as much of the text
as would -fit in the space allocated -for the attribute BODY.
I-f the entire message text could not be contained in the
alloted space then the mail message would be continued in
another table. The deviation is being made in order to
enhance access control over the objects of the text.
ID ! TEXT
Figure 4.13. Body Table schema
The Body Table is envisioned to be a simple text table.
The schema of the Body Table is illustrated in Figure 4.13
and the text attribute is described by the Schema Table
tuple in Figure 4.14. TEXT follows a typical SO column
terminal screen format.
ID NAME TYPE WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE
TEXT CHAR 80 iBQDY TABLE!
Figure 4.14. Schema Table rows for Body Table
G. DIRECTORY TABLE ACCESS TABLE
As noted earlier, the Directory Table Access Table is an
access list which specifies those users authorized read
access to the corresponding Mail Directory Table tuple and
71

access to the associated Mail Data Table. It should be noted
that while the Directory Table Access Table -filters access
to the associated Mail Data Table, the user requesting
access must still go through individual mail message checks
involving the Mail Message Control Table, Access Control
Table, and the Object Control Table before he/she is granted
access to the individual tuples of the Mail Data Table.
ID ! USER !
Figure 4.15. Directory Table Access Table schema
In Figure 4. 15 we see the basic structure of the
Directory Table Access Table and in Figure 4.16 its Schema
Table tuple is presented. Although the Directory Table
Access Table is used as an access list, there are only
implied pairs. The USER field is explicitly filled in with
the user id of a user authorized access. The read capability
for the corresponding Mail Directory Table tuple is
implied. It is automatically assumed that the designated
administrator of the associated Mail Data Table is allowed
read access to the corresponding Mail Directory tuple and
access to its Mail Data Table. His/her user-id need not
appear in the Directory Table Access Table. The Directory
Table Access Table may only be filled in by the designated
administrator of the Mail Data Table or the SSO role.

ID NAME TYPE WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE
USER I CHAR 10 ! USER ID IDIR_T3L_AC;
! ,' i ! OWNER .'ACCESS TBLi
Figure 4.16. Schema Table row for the Directory Table
Access Table
H. MAIL MESSAGE CONTROL TABLE
The Mail Message Control Table is the -first level of
access control on an individual mail message basis. There
is a row in the Mail Message Control table -for each message
in the associated Mail Data Table. Correspondence between
the Mail Message Control Table and the Mail Data Table is
maintained using the ID attribute. The ID o-f a tuple in the
Mail Message Control Table is the same as its associated
Mail Data Table tuple. The schema for the Mail Message
Control Table is found in Figure 4.16 and the corresponding
Schema Table tuples Are presented in Figure 4.17.
! ID ! M CLEAR ! M COMPART .* M CAVEAT ! CLEAR !
0_C0MPART ,' 0_CAVEAT ,' ACT ,' OCT I
Figure 4.16. Mail Message Control Table schema
The M_CLEAR, M_C0MPART, and M_CAVEAT fields correspond
to the minimum clearance, compartments, and caveats that the
user must be able to operate under in order to access the
associated mail message. With regards to the MMS security
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model, this is a modified form of the CONTAINER CLEARANCE
attribute. The setting of these fields indicate a minimum
clearance level that must be met in order to obtain access
to the container. 0_CLEAR, 0_COMPART, and 0_CAVEAT define
the overall clearance, compartment i zati on , and caveat
control of the corresponding mail message. ACT holds the
unique name of a table holding the access control pairs for
the mail message. OCT holds the unique name of the table
which contains the classification of e^ch object in the mail
message.
WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE




















0_COMPART BOOLEAN 16 COMPART
M_C0MPART
MSG_CON_TBL
0_CAVEAT BOOLEAN 16 CAVEAT
M_CAVEAT
MSG_CGN_TBL I
ACT CHAR ' 20 MSG_CON_TBL i
OCT CHAR 20 MSG_CON_TBL!




1+ the mail message was sent from another user, then the
M_CLEAR, M_COMPART, and M_CAv"EAT values Are -filled in by the
system during the send operation -from values indicated by
the sender. Otherwise they are left blank until filled in
by either the SSO role or the designated administrator. In
the case of the administrator, he/she must meet any existing
minimum requirements before he/she can change them.
0_CLEAR, 0_COMPART, 0_CAVEAT, ACT, and OCT fields are filled
in by the system during the send operation or a write
operati on.
I. ACCESS CONTROL TABLE
The Access Control Table holds the access pairs
corresponding to the associated mail message. There is a
tuple for each user or role authorized access to the mail
message. Figure 4.19 gives the schema for the Access
Control Table and Figure 4.20 shows the Schema Table tuples
which describe it.
S ID I USER I VIEWED_ACC i FR0M_ACC I T0_ACC .'
C0PY_T0_ACC ! DTG_ACC ,' SUBJECT_ACC ! B0DY_ACC ,'
Figure 4.19. Access Control Table schema
USER holds the designated role or the unique userid of
the user granted access. Access is controlled on the basis
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of NO ACCESS, READ ONLY, WRITE ONLY, or UPDATE (READ and
WRITE). A two bit boolean is used to indicate the type o-f
access allowed: 00 NO ACCESS, 01 READ ONLY, 10 WRITE ONLY,
and 11 UPDATE. VIEWED_ACC, FR0M_ACC, T0_ACC, C0PY_T0_ACC,
DTG_ACC, and SUBJECT_ACC indicate the respective -fields of
the Mail Data Table tuple to which they apply. With regard
to Body_acc, this applies to the associated Body Table and
not the BODY attribute. Only the designated administrator
and the SSO role are allowed read and write access to the
Access Control Table. Either may enter, delete, or modify
access pairs in the Access Control Table. Each user
indicated in the Access Control Table is allowed read only
access to his/her respective tuple only in order to
determine access rights.
ID NAME TYPE WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE




VIEWED_ACC BOOLEAN <-} ACCESS_TBL
!
FR0M_ACC BOOLEAN 2 ACCESS_TBL \
T0_ACC BOOLEAN 2 ACCESS_TBL
C0PY_T0_ACC ! BOOLEAN 2 ACCESS_TBL
DTG_ACC I BOOLEAN ! 2 ACCESS_TBL
SUBJECT_ACC ! BOOLEAN ! 2 ACCE3S_TBL J
' BODY_ACC ! BOOLEAN ! 2 ACCESS_TBL
Figure 4.20. Schema Table rows for Access Control Table
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J. OBJECT CONTROL TABLE
Since a mail message is a multiobject container, the
Object Control Table is used to hold the classification,
compartments, and caveats associated with each object in the
corresponding mail message. Figure 4.21 gives the schema
for the Object Control Table and the respective Schema Table
tuples are presented in Figure 4.22. CLASS, COMPART, and
CAVEAT represent the classification, compartments, and
caveats assigned to the respective object. OFFSET is used
to determine the delineation of objects in the body of the
mail message as indicated below.
! ID .' CLASS ! COMPART ,' CAVEAT ! OFFSET !
Figure 4.21. Object Control Table schema
The VIEWED, FROM, TO, COPY_TO, DTG, and SUBJECT
attributes of a mail message tuple are each considered as
single objects. The actual body of the mail message (found
in the Body Table named in the BODY attribute) may or may
not contain multiple objects. The VIEWED and DTG values
will be looked upon as being unclassified and no tuples will
be maintained in the Object Control Table for them. The
first four rows of the Object Control Table are assigned the
classification requirements of the TO, FROM, COPY_TO, and
SUBJECT data respectively. The corresponding OFFSET values
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for these objects indicate the length o-f the objects in
characters.
Rows five onward indicate the respective classification
requirements of the objects of the mail message body in the
order that they appear in the body. The OFFSET value of a
mail message body's object indicates the ID of the last row
occupied by the object in the associated Body Table. The
first object of the Body Table occupies rows one through its
indicated OFFSET. Each subsequent object is delineated upon
the previous object's OFFSET and its own OFFSET. Thus, each
subsequent object occupies those rows from the next row past
the previous object (ID = the previous object's OFFSET + 1)
to its own OFFSET. This does require that the system
provides one—up ID numbers at each send and write
operations.
ID NAME TYPE WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE












OFFSET I INTEGER 6 1 ID OBJ CONTRL
Figure 4.22. Schema Table rows for Object Control Table
73

The Object Control Table is filled in by the system when
the mail message is first created (written to a Mail Data
Table by a send or write operation) and as part of each
subsequent write operation. As one of the final functions
of both the send and write operations, the 0_CLEAR,
0_COMPART, and 0_CAVEAT fields of the Mail Message Control
Table are filled in. This presumes that during these
operations the system is able to determine the appropriate
classification, compartments, and caveats associated with
each object. There are a number of ways that this can be
accomplished. For purpose of simplicity, it might be
designated that the classification, compartments, and
caveats for a given object must be in certain positions with
respect to an object. In this case, the positional
requirements might follow along with DoD requirements for
classification markings of documents. For delineation of
objects in the Body Table it might be required that all
objects start with a TEXT tuple with the word "object" in
its first six positions and the remaining positions blank.
It is felt, however, that it would be placing undue
implementation restrictions on the design if this thesis
were to establish explicit means ior conveying such
information. Therefore, for purposes of this thesis, it






The aim of this chapter is to establish an appropriate
modularization of information and functions which supports
and enhances the proposed multilevel security aspects of the
mail application. Section B gives a brief overview of the
proposed modularization. Sections C, D, and E provide more
in—depth information on the three principal modules. In
order to more fully accommodate the MMS security model
within the proposed modularization, some additional security
features are necessary. These are discussed in section F.
It should be noted that, as in the Military Message Systems
security model, auditing is not addressed here.
B. OVERVIEW
Due to its general applicability, the modularization
proposed in this chapter closely follows that proposed for
MULTISAFE CRef. 163. The information and functions of the
mail application are divided among three logically separated
modules: Security Access Module (SAM), Storage and Retrieval
Module (SRM) , and the User Terminal Module (UTM) . The SAM
mediates all accesses to circumscribed information. Storage
and retrieval of Mail Data Tables and Body Tables are
performed by the SRM. The role of the UTM is to provide data
manipulation functions and preprocess access queries. An
SO

underlying assumption is made that each module has its own
separate processing unit.
All communications between modules is by messages and
only two logical paths of communications exist: UTM <— > SAM
and SAM <— > SRM. The SAM, there-fore, logically sits between
the user and the mail messages. From this position it can
control all accesses to circumscribed information.
As a quick reference for the reader, Figure 5.1 shows
the distribution of the existing tables between the SAM and
SRM modules. An additional table, the UTM Table, is
described in section F. It is used for conveying the












Figure 5.1. Distribution of Tables
C. SECURITY ACCESS MODULE
As indicated above, the overall function of the SAM is
to mediate all accesses to circumscribed information on the
system. For the purposes of the application at hand, there
are two types of circumscribed information. The first
ai

includes the mail messages. The mail messages ar& the
repository of the actual classified information which
requires multilevel security. This information is found in
the tuples of the Mail Data Tables and the associated Body
Tables.
The second type of circumscribed information encompasses
the access control information which the SAM needs to
mediate access to the first type of information. A given
mail message and its security control information define a
relation which is normally considered integrally. Under
this relation, a mail message and all of its associated
security control information could theoretically be stored
in the same tuple. In this case we would see the access
control information described in Chapter 4 stored along with
the associated mail message it protects. For example, such
information as a given message's access pairs from the
Access Control Table, the minimum clearance level required,
and the overall classification level would be stored with
the message. This could prove cumbersome and detract from
the overall security of the system.
A special ef-fort has been made, however, to maintain the
separation of the message and its control information while
sustaining the original relation. Given any control
information as described in Chapter 4, it can be associated
with the message it protects. Although this e-ffort has
resulted in the security control information of a given
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message being distributed among a number of tables, it
permits the system to take advantage o-f the -fixed format of
these tables in retrieving control information and enhances
the security of the control information.
With the separation of the security control information
from its associated classified information, a database of
security information can be established which is strictly
under the control of and accessible only by the SAM. This
will encapsulate all of the access control related
information within the SAM, enhancing the conditions for
possible future verification by eliminating the dispersion
of the access control information throughout the entire
system.
At first it may appear that the Schema Table does not
hold security information. In truth there is no direct
security control relation between it and any given mail
message. There is, however, an indirect relation since the
Schema Table defines all other tables to the system.
Because access control depends on accurately interpreting
the information found in the other tables, the Schema Table
plays a role in access control.
As was noted earlier, the SAM logically sits between the
user and the stored mail messages. This is derived from its
relative position with respect to the two logical
communication paths. The existence of two logical paths is
taken from the point o-f view of servicing a single user.
S3

The user's request -for access travels to the SAM via the
UTM <— > SAM logical path. There the SAM determines if the
access is allowed. I-f the access is allowed and requires
retrieval by the SRM, then the SAM sends a request to the
SRM via the SAM <— > SRM path -for the required table or
tables. When the SRM has performed the required retrieval,
the table or tables ars sent to the SAM via the SAM <— > SRM
path. The SAM performs any filtering necessary and sends
the response to the user via the UTM <— > SAM path.
The UTM <— > SAM and SAM <— > SRM paths are the only
paths that a given user's request can travel. When viewed,
however, with respect to the system as a whole, there is one
SAM <— > SRM path, but there is a separate UTM <— > SAM path
servicing each terminal accessing the system. To maintain
the two logical paths concept for each given user, a unique
user /terminal identifier must be appended in an unalterable
manner to each request upon receipt by the SAM. The
identifier remains with the request until it is answered by
the SAM, thus assuring proper delivery back to the
originating user. A similar concept is used by MULTISAFE
CRef. 16: pp. 390-394 J. Such a method allows communication
between users only via mail messages where one user's
request sends a mail message to a second user's Mail Data
Table and the second user's request reads the mail message.
There is no direct communication between users and each
user's request is handled as a separate message with no
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inter-message communication. It is, therefore, reasonable
to view the system as having only two logical communication
paths.
As indicated above, the position of the SAM at the ends
of the two logical communication paths allows it to mediate
all accesses to circumscribed information. The first layer
of the SAM's access mediation is its control over the flow
of messages within the system. All message flows between
the UTM and SAM and the SAM and SRM aro controlled by SAM
requests for message transmissions. The SAM polls the UTM's
to determine if a user request exists. When a request is
detected, the SAM acknowledges, allocates a buffer arsa for
the request, requests the UTM to send the request, and
assigns a user /terminal identifier to the request at time of
transmission. Once the request is received in full, the SAM
can begin processing it. The request must be received in
full to insure that the user makes no changes to the request
after access checking begins.
Processing starts with determining the type of request.
If additional information is needed from the user, such as
user authentication during the log on, the SAM issues a
request to the UTM for the additional information. Once all
necessary information is assembled, the SAM determines if
the access is authorized according to its security control
information. If the access is not authorized then the SAM
sends a generic acknowledgement to indicate the access can
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not be per -formed. A generic acknowledgement is sent in
order to reduce possible covert channels of communication.
Under such channels of communication, information can be
conveyed by the type of denial acknowledgement made. If the
access is authorized and access is to the security control
information, the SAM retrieves the appropriate information
from its local database, performs any required filtering of
the information, attaches authenti cator information to each
tuple (explained in section E)
,
and informs the UTM that a
request response is available. When the UTM is ready, the
SAM sends the response to the UTM.
If the user's request is authorized and requires service
by the SRM, the SAM requests the SRM to retrieve the
necessary tables. In much the same way it polls the UTM,
the SAM polls the SRM to determine if it has any responses
to requests ready for transmission. If a response is ready,
the SAM acknowledges, allocates a buffer area, for processing
the response and requests the SRM to start transmission.
Unlike processing the initial request, the entire response
need not be received before the SAM begins processing it.
During its processing of the response, the SAM filters the
response based on its access control information, attaches
authenticator information to each tuple (explained in
section E) , and informs the UTM that a request response is
available. When the UTM is ready, the SAM sends the
response to the UTM.
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Within the description above -for the SAM ' s control over
the -flow of messages, we have also seen its two other
aspects of control associated with mediation o-f access.
These are access authorization checking and filtering.
Access authorization checking begins with the logon checking
to guarantee the user is authorized access to the system.
If access is authorized, then the SAM dynamically maintains
user related information which will be necessary to mediate
any accesses to circumscribed information. This would
minimally include the user's id, user's current role, user's
clearance level (to include clearance as well as compartment
and caveat capabilities), and the maximum classification
level of information that can be sent to the user.
The maximum classification level (to include
classification as well as compartments and caveats) is
determined by the maximum common clearance, compartment, and
caveat values derived from the clearance levels (taken from
the Users Table) of the user and the terminal he is
operating from. For the maximum common classification, the
minimum of the respective CLEAR values according to the DoD
hierarchy is assumed. For the maximum common compartment
and caveat values, the COMPART and CAVEAT values of the user
clearance level are logically "AND"ed with the respective
values of the terminal classification level. Taken together
the maximum common classification, maximum common
compartment, and the maximum common caveat values form the
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maximum cl assif ication level of information that can be sent
to the user.
For any access to circumscribed information, access
authorization checking uses a layered approach where a user
may be denied access at any layer in the checking. It
should be noted that the layered approach presented here is
based primarily on the underlying threading through of
tables required by the distribution of control information
and the basic serial nature of most processors. If parallel
processing could be used in a verifiable manner, then the
access checking could be done simultaneously.
Using access to information in a given tuple of a Mail
Data Table or access to the associated Body Table as an
example, access authorization checking begins with the Mail
Directory Table. The SAM checks the minimum clearance
,
compartment, and caveat requirements associated with the
corresponding Mail Data Table against the clearance level of
the requesting user. If the user passes this layer, the SAM
consults the Directory Table Access Table to determine if
the user is on the access list for the associated Mail Data
Table. Success here takes the SAM to the Mail Message
Control Table. There the minimum clearance, compartment, and
caveat requirements for the given mail message is checked
against the clearance level of the requesting user. Upon
success, the last layer of access authorization checking is
reached. The Access Control Table is checked to determine
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i-f the user or user's current role is on the access list
along with permission -for the requested access.
In the situation where the user is requesting access to
access control information in the SAM's database, an
abbreviated form of the above access authorization checking
is used. The user's current role is checked. I* the user
is operating in the SSO role then the user will be granted
access to the requested access control information which is
not solely under the control o-f the system. I-f the
requesting user is not operating under the SSO role, then
the corresponding tuple o-f the Mail Directory Table is
checked to determine if the user is the designated
administrator (OWNER). Passing this layer, the requesting
user must meet the minimum clearance, compartment, and
caveat requirements stored in the Mail Directory Table tuple
if accessing the Mail Directory Table or Directory Table
Access Table control information. If the user is requesting
access to tuples in the Mail Message Control Table or Access
Control Table then he must meet the minimum clearance,
compartment, and caveat requirements stored in the
corresponding Mail Message Control Table. Provided the user
meets the appropriate above requirements, then the user will
be granted access to that control information which the
administrator is authorized to as noted in Chapter 4.
A user who is not the designated administrator is
allowed to read that information in the Access Control Table
89

which defines his/her access rights. In this case the user
must meet the minimum clearance level indicated in the Mail
Directory Table. If this is met then he/she must meet the
minimum clearance level for the mail message that the Access
Control Table is associated with. This minimum clearance
level is indicated in the Mail Message Control Table,
Finally, the user or user's current role must be included in
the access list of the Access Control Table. Read only
access is then granted to the access information associated
with the requesting user.
Filtering is the final aspect of the SAM's access
mediation discussed here. With filtering, the information
to be included in a response to a given user's request is
more exactly defined than is done- in the more general access
authorization checking. With regards to access of the
access control information, filtering is incorporated partly
in the access authorization checking. As described in
Chapter 4, some of the attributes of those tables containing
access control information are universally defined for
system use only or for user access only under the SSO role.
These attributes are automatically filtered out accordingly
by the SAM.
With respect to the mail messages, filtering is based
directly on the associated Access Control Table and Object
Control Table. The Access Control Table is used to filter
information based on discretionary access rights and the
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Object Control Table is used to filter information based on
mandatory clearance controls. Under mandatory clearance
checking, the classification (taken from the Object Control
Table) of each object not filtered out by the Access Control
Table is checked to determine if it is less than or equal to
the maximum classification level.
The object's classification is compared against the
maximum common classification level. If it is less than or
equal then the the maximum common compartment and caveat
values are "XOR"ed (exclusive "OR"ed) with the object's
respective values. This will eliminate all "1" bits that
are common. The resultant compartment and caveat values are
then "AND"ed with the object's respective values. If the
object's classification level has any compartment or caveat
values not included in the maximum classification level,
then they will remain as "1" bits in the compartment and
caveat values resulting from the "AND" operation. The
information in the object is not forwarded to the user if
its classification is greater than the maximum common
classification or if either of the compartment or caveat
values resulting from the "AND" operation are non-zero.
D. USER TERMINAL MODULE
As noted in the overview, the primary joos of the UTM
are to provide data manipulation functions and preprocess
user access queries. The UTM derives its name from the
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basic concept that all of the UTM software resides
(minimally while the user is legged onto the system) in the
sealed terminal, alterable only by authorised individuals.
There are a number of ways that this might be done. One
possible way is that the software resides in the ROM of the
terminal. Another is that the software resides on
nonvolatile internal secondary storage such as a Winchester
disk or bubble memory. The software could also be
downloaded to the terminal each time a user logs onto the
system. Each has its associated costs.
In the case of the ROM, changes to the software requires
new ROMs or reprogrammed PROMs. For the secondary memory,
changes to software means going in and rewriting the
storage. Downloading requires communication facilities
which would allow rapid transfer of the software. All three
methods would require sufficient RAM storage or secondary
storage for application specific operations.
This application has been designed around the concept
that there will be communication facilities for the rapid
transfer of large amounts of data. All three basic access
operations (read, write, and send) provide for the bulk
transfer of data without manipulation. Accordingly, there
is already a requirement for communication facilities which
allow the rapid transfer of data. Thus, for the purposes of
this thesis, it is assumed that the UTM software is
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downloaded into RAM storage and that there is sufficient RAM
storage to handle table storage and data manipulations.
Such a configuration would be more versatile than the
other two cited, providing the user with the latest software
at each logon. With this configuration, other applications
of the original ISS system could be more easily incorporated
by requesting the downloading of the appropriate software.
It would even be possible to incorporate other applications
not envisioned in ISS. Since security control is over
objects, any application where the information could be
divided into individual objects would be a candidate for
implementation within this configuration. For example, the
set of coordinates of a screen display or partial screen
display could be considered as an object. Downloading
graphics software to handle such sets of coordinates would
allow the control and display of non-textual material, thus
increasing the versatility of terminal usage and security
software.
Unlike most modern multiuser systems where all the
functions of a mail application are most likely found in a
single module, the functions of the mail application of this
thesis are distributed across the three modules in order to
enhance security and minimize the impact on performance
which often accompanies a high level of security. Security
is enhanced because all of the access control information
and security checking falls under one module. The impact on
93

performance is minimised because more simultaneity of
operation is introduced. With separate processing units,
each module performs independent o-f what the other modules
are doing. In addition, the SAM is responsible only -for
security functions instead of security functions and user
process execution like the CPUs of many multiuser computer
systems.
Under this distribution of functions the actual physical
storage and retrieval of mail messages is controlled by the
SRM. The logical storage and retrieval, however, is
controlled by the SAM. The SAM logically controls the
storage and retrieval in the sense that it determines which
Mail Data Table and Body Table the message is to be stored
in or retrieved from and directs the SRM to perform the
appropriate operation. The name of the Mail Data Table and
Body Table are included as parameters in the SAM's request
to the SRM for a storage or retrieval.
The logical storage and retrieval operations controlled
by the SAM are read, send, and write. The handling of the
read operation depends on whether it involves access control
information or mail message information. If it involves
access control information but the control information does
not exist, the read is rejected. If the control message
exists and the user is either operating in the SSO role or
is the administrator of the associated Mail Data Table, then
the read is authorized. If the user is requesting to read
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his/her access rights -for a given message and the user or
user's role is in the Access Control Table for that message,
then the read is authorized. All other read requests to
control information Are denied. For all authorized control
information read requests, the control information is
retrieved from the SAM's local database, filtered based on
the restrictions noted in Chapter 4, and forwarded to the
UTM.
In the case of mail message information, if the mail
message does not exist, then the read is rejected. If the
mail message exists, then the SAM checks the associated
Access Control Table to determine whether the user or user's
current role is listed with read privileges. If either is
then the SAM requests the SRM to retrieve the mail message,
filters the mail message based on control information from
the Access Control Table and Object Control Table, and
forwards the result to the UTM. Otherwise the read is
denied.
For a send request the SAM determines i-f the target Mail
Data Table exists. If it does not then the send is
rejected. If it exists then the SAM checks the access list
(Directory Table Access Table) for the destination Mail Data
Table to determine whether the sender is in the access
list. If the sender is on the list then the SAM appends the
DTG, establishes the appropriate access control information,
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and directs the SRM to store the mail message. Otherwise
the send request is denied.
The write operation is handled is a manner similar to
the read request. If the write involves access control
information and the indicated control table does not exist,
then the write is rejected. Otherwise the write access
depends on whether the user is operating under the SSO role
or is the administrator of the associated Mail Data Table.
If either is the case then the write is authorised subject
to the restrictions noted in Chapter 4. If not, the write is
deni ed.
If the write involves mail message information and the
indicated mail message does not exist, then the user is
attempting to create a message through a write operation.
Provided the user is requesting to have the in-formation
written to a Mail Data Table -for which he/she is an
administrator, the SAM fills in the DTG, establishes the
appropriate access control information, and directs the SRM
to store the mail message. Else the write is denied.
In the case where the mail message exists, the SAM
determines which parts of the mail message (TO, FROM,
COPY_TO, SUBJECT, text) that the user wishes to write. If
the user or the user's current role is in the Access Control
Table along with write permission for all of the requested
parts or the user is the administrator of the associated
Mail Data Table, then the SAM requests the SRM to retrieve
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the associated mail message, overwrites the requested parts,
updates the DTG -field if blank, reestablishes the
appropriate access control information, and requests the SRM
to store the written mail message. Otherwise the write
action is denied. In all cases of denied access operations,
the user is notified appropriately.
With the logical read, send, and write operations
(access requests) handled by the SAM and the actual physical
storage o-f mail messages performed by the SRM, data
manipulation and preprocessing of access requests are the
primary jobs of the UTM. Data manipulation includes such
actions as searching, displaying, and modifying retrieval
information as well as the creation o-f new information.
Much o-f the data manipulation operations, if not all, could
be provided by the kernel of operators provided by ISS as
discussed in chapter 3. The resident software of the UTM
would provide these data manipulation capabilities.
As far as the preprocessing of the user access queries
(read, send, and write), the resident software would assure
that the requests Are in the format required by the SAM.
This could be done in a number of ways. One such way is
that the resident software provides an interactive process
which solicits the information to be included in the read,
send, and write requests. Inherent in the data manipulation
o-f retrieved data, creation of new data, and the
preprocessing of access requests is the underlying memory
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management and display of the highest classification level
on the screen.
E. STGRAGE AND RETRIEVAL MODULE
As indicated above, the primary functions of the SRM a.re
the actual physical storage and retrieval of mail message
information. These storage and retrieval operations occur
in response to SAM requests. In order to provide for the
integrity of the mail messages, the SRM also carries on
backup operations on a periodic basis.
In order to provide for an undo capability, the SRM
could incorporate an archival system which would maintain a
set number of generations of a given mail message. Under
such a system, each write operation causes a copy of the old
version to be archived prior to the storing of the new
version. If the user found that he wanted to go back to a
previous version, he would request to read the desired
archive version of the mail message and then write it as the
current version.
F. ADDITIONAL SECURITY FEATURES
While the proposed modularization does e-f-f&ct certain
benefits as noted above, it generates a gap in the security
control of information which must be bridged. This gap is
the lack of control over the information once it leaves the
SAM either for the SRM or UTM. This lack of control occurs
in two primary areas: the unauthorized manipulation of data
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while in the UTM and SRM and the unauthorized reading of
data while in the SRM module. The threat of unauthorized
reading of data while in the UTM does not exist since the
user only receives what he is authorized to see.
As noted in the preface to the security assumptions made
in the MMS security model, "It will always be possible for a
valid user to compromise information to which he has
legitimate access CRef. 15: p. 93." Although compromise may
always be a possibility, it is also a possibility to limit
the range of means available to the user to effect the
compromise. Without the access control information that the
SAM has, it is impossible to control all unauthorized
manipulation of data on the UTM's terminal screen. It is,
however, possible to limit the screen oriented manipulations
and to detect the changes if the data is written back to its
respective tables or sent to an output device (assume output
must go through SAM). Since no data manipulation is
authorized while stored on the SRM, any change there would
have to be detectable.
The procedure to accomplish this involves the use of
additional attributes to accompany Mail Data Table and Body
Table information. These attributes are authenticators and
bits which indicate whether the associated information is
read only. An authenticator is a means to provide an
integrity check over a specified amount of data. It is a
bit pattern which results from a calculation performed over
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the data it is to check. The same bit pattern results each
time the calculation is performed over the same data. If
the data changes, however, a different bit pattern is
produced by the calculation.
The number of authenticators which must be provided
depends on the granularity of detection desired. In
general, a separate authenticator would be appended to each
tuple in order to detect any changes to the tuple as a
whole. If, however, subsections of the tuple must be
accounted for individually, then there would be an
authenticator appended to the tuple for each subsection
requiring an integrity check.
If we consider the integrity checking of a tuple from
the Mail Data Table, eleven authenticators would be needed.
An authenticator would be needed -far each of the
classifications of the classified objects (TO, FROM,
COPY_TO, and SUBJECT), for each of the classified objects,
and for the three unclassified data items (VIEWED, DTG, and
BODY). Such an authenticator scheme would permit the
detection of changes to the classification and to the values
of the attributes.
While the configuration of the Mail Data Table tuple as
described in Chapter 4 is convenient for the SAM's mediation
of access and such an authenticator scheme would be
convenient for data stored on the SRM, they Are not
necessarily convenient for the UTM. Neither do they provide
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for easy detection of the case where a user inserts
classified data into an object classified lower than the
inserted data.
In order to overcome these weaknesses, a fixed table
structure will be used in transferring data between the SAM
and the UTM. Figure 5.2 shows the schema for the UTM Table
and Figure 5.3 shows the respective Schema Table rows.
R_ONLY indicates if the associated text is read only and can
not be modified by the user. It is set by the SAM according
to the associated value taken from the corresponding Access
Control Table. C_AUTHEN and T_AUTHEN are authenticators for
the classification and text of the tuple respectively. They
•
are set by the SAM following separate authenticator
calculations on the respective classification and text
values. TYPE indicates the type of information in the text
portion of the table. For example the following codes might
be used to indicate the text is from the respective
attributes of a Mail Data Table: T for TO, F for FROM, C for
COPY_TO, V for VIEWED, D for DTG, and S for SUBJECT. CLASS,
COMPART, and CAVEAT reier to the classification,
compartments, and caveats associated with the text of the
tuple. Their values are taken directly from the Object
Control Table.
Finally, TEXT represents the information from the
associated attributes. As described in Chapter 4. TO, FROM,
COPY_TO, and SUBJECT are variable length fields. In order
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to accommodate them in a fixed length TEXT column in the UTM
Table, a decision must be made on how much to put in each
TEXT column. If we assume that all data for these
attributes originated from the UTM using lines from an 80
column screen to fill the TEXT portion of the UTM Table
tuples, then the decision is made by the user. When the
data is to be stored, the SAM need only use delimiters in
the above variable length fields of the Mail Data Table to
indicate where to split the variable length fields into
fixed length TEXT fields format of the UTM Table when
retrieved. This can also facilitate efficiency of physical
storage on the SRM if all trailing blanks Are suppressed by
the SAM prior to storage.
! ID ! R ONLY ! C AUTHEN ! T AUTHEN ' CLASS I COMPART !
CAVEAT I TYPE ! TEXT !
Figure 5.2. UTM Table
If we look at the other two types of information which
are controlled by the SAM, the text of mail messages and
access control information, we see that they can easilv be
accommodated by the UTM Table. Since the TEXT attribute of
the Body Table is already stored in 80 character text
format, the conversion to the UTM Table TEXT is direct. The
io:

character B could be used to indicate the type and the
remaining information could be set in the manner described
above.
TYPE WIDTH SYNONYM TABLE
R_ONLY BOOLEAN 1 UTM_TABLE
C_AUTHEN BINARY 16 UTM_TABLE
T_AUTHEN BINARY 16 UTM_TABLE
TYPE CHAR 1 UTM_TABLE
CLASS CHAR 1 UTM_TABLE
OBJJZONTRL









TEXT CHAR i 80 UTM_TABLE
BODY TABLE
Figure 5.2. Schema Table rows -for UTM Table
For control information, the values of control
attributes could be held in the TEXT portion of the tuple,
using delimiters to separate them. The TYPE field could
indicate how to interpret the access control values in the
TEXT field. For example, an M in the TYPE field might mean
the values in the text field represent the minimum
clearance, compartment, and caveat values from a tuple in
the Mail Directory Table.
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With the UTM Table and the underlying assumption that
the user only has access to the TEXT information as
presented by the UTM, the lack o-f control over unauthorized
manipulation of information after it leaves the SAM for the
UTM can be overcome. With the R_ONLY information, the UTM
can prevent direct manipulation of read only material. The
classification level values (CLASS, COMPART, and CAVEAT)
along with the type can be used to prevent the insertion of
higher classified information into objects of lower
classification. Although the UTM performs these controls,
they a.re only a form of security screening meant to limit
the range of means available to the user to effect a
compromise. They can limit to an extent what the user can
display on a terminal to effect a compromise. The true
security control still lies with the SAM.
With its access control information and the
authenticators attached to the tuples, it can determine if
any manipulations have taken place when the data is written
back to a table or sent to an output device. To verify the
data protected by an authenticator , the SAM needs only to
recompute the authenticator based on the data returned. If
the newly computed authenticator does not match the
corresponding authenticator returned with the data, then a
change has been made. Otherwise the data is assumed
unmodified. Even if a change is made, it need not be
unauthorized. The SAM would have to determine this from its
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access control in-formation and the operation being
requested.
In the case of data stored on the SRM, no changes to the
stored data are allowed. The major concern, there-fore, is
the detection o-f any changes. This would involve only the
use o-f authenticators. Although the eleven authenticators
per tuple scheme offered earlier would obtain fine
granularity in detecting where changes have occurred in a
Mail Data Table tuple, only one authenti cator per tuple
would be necessary to detect a change in the tuple.
Although this only provides tuple level granularity in
detecting where the change has occurred, it is probably
justifiable and sufficient for most situations. Likewise,
one authenti cator per Body Table tuple would be sufficient.
The checking for alterations would occur when the
information is retrieved and follows the same type of
authenti cator check noted above.
The remaining control gap to be bridged is the
unauthorized reading of data while stored on the SRM. The
solution to this would be for the SAM to encrypt the mail
message data before transmission to the SRM. Only those
parameters required by the SRM for proper storage of the
data need remain unencrypted.
Since the delineation of objects is maintained in the
Object Control Tables, an interesting alternative solution
to the "pass through" problem is possible. The "pass
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through" problem is described as follows:
The pass—through problem occurs when the database
management system, in order to get to certain data, must
access some other data which have di-f-ferent protection
requirements. The situation is critical if these latter
protection requirements are more stringent than the
requirements for the requested data. An example of the
problem is to search for confidential documents by passing
through a pile of classified documents with information
being designated as top secret, secret, and confidential.
In this case, highly classified documents with top—secret
and secret designations are being looked at for the
purpose of finding the more lowly classified, confidential
documents. A goal of every designer and implementor is to
build secure database systems which will incur no
pass—through problem. CRef . 17: p. 2333
The "pass through" problem occurs in the SAM's filtering
process. For example, if a user with a confidential
clearance would be granted access to the text of a mail
message with data classified up to top secret, the whole
corresponding Body Table would be retrieved from the SRM in
order to filter out all objects classified less than or
equal to confidential.
Although the retrieval of the Body Table is unavoidable,
it is still possible to minimize the "pass through" effect.
If each object were encrypted with a key based in part on
its classification, then from the Body Table example above,
only the objects passing the filtering based on the Object
Control Table need be unencrypted by the SAM. Thus, even
though the other objects were effectively passed through by




VI. USER FUNCTIONS AND MODEL COMPLIANCE
A. INTRODUCTION
Two basic topics are covered in this chapter. Section B
proposes the fundamental user functions which must be
incorporated into the User Terminal Module (UTM) resident
software so that the user can direct the Security Access
Module (SAM) in its access mediation. Section C discusses
the design's compliance with the security assertions of the
Military Message System (MMS) security model.
B. USER FUNCTIONS
As indicated in Chapter 3, the aim of this thesis is to
develop the conceptual design of those features which would
make the electronic mail application of the Integrated
Software System <ISS) multilevel secure. All efforts have
been made to maintain this attitude of a high level design.
To this extent, the interface between the user and the SAM '
s
access mediation will be discussed in terms of interface
functions provided the user through the UTM instead of
implementation specific syntax and semantics. The
definition of the latter should be accomplished during the
design of the UTM resident software.
One of the goals of the ISS was the design of a set of
primitive table operators and general system commands which
would form the kernel of the ISS. This so called kernel of
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commands as seen in Chapter 3 is common to all five
applications o-f the ISS. As a kernel, the command set
provides a degree o-f commonality which allows the user to
move from processing in one application to another with a
minimum of mental reorientation.
In keeping with the kernel concept, the user interface
functions necessary to direct the SAIi in its access
mediation have been limited to seven: LOGON, ROLE SET, READ,
WRITE, DOWNGRADE, SEND, AND ERASE. It is felt that these
seven functions would provide the necessary user directed
control while minimizing the number of functionally diverse
operations that the SAM would have to recognize and
accommodate. This minimization of interface functions
should allow a degree of minimization in the amount of
software necessary to implement the SAM. If other
applications of the ISS were to be incorporated, the
selected seven functions would form a kernel of security
functions which would be common to all incorporated
applications. Whereas the SEND function may appear to be
mail application specific, it could be used in general to
transfer any given application's tables from one user to
another in a manner which preserves access mediation.
As the seven functions are discussed below, it should be
remembered that all communications between the UTM and the
SAM Are under the direction of the SAM. The UTM preprocesses
the user's access request (interface function) and at the
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next polling by the SAM, informs the SAM that an access
request exists. Once the SAM permits the transfer, the UTM
transmits the request to the SAM.
As part o-f each interface function, the UTM gathers the
information required by the access request. This may be
done through user created tables designated in the request
command, solicited from the user via an interactive process,
or a combination of the two. Once the UTM has all of the
information, it is placed in a UTM Table in a form
recognizable by the SAM, to include setting the TYPE field
for each tuple. Finally, the UTM Table is integrated into
the message format used for all communication. These
general operations must be performed for each of the
functions presented.
The first function is the LOGON function. As with most
systems, the user initiates the LOGON function in order to
gain access to the system. During the logon, the UTM
establishes connection with the SAM and requests the
initiation of the logon sequence. During the logon
sequence, the UTM solicits the authentication information
from the user and transmits it to the SAM. Under the
assumption that the UTM's software is downloaded after a
successful logon, the UTM must receive the software and load
it into the proper location in memory or secondary storage.
If the SAM rejects the authentication, the UTM notifies the
user and resolicits if directed by the SAM. In order to
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perform the LOGON -function, the UTM must have sufficient
resident nonvolatile software (preferably ROM) to initiate
and carry on these operations.
The ROLE SET function is provided to allow the user to
change the role that he/she is currently operating under.
When a user successfully logs onto the system, his/her
initial role is established as a plain user (no established
role). If the user wishes to perform an operation tnat
requires a particular role (System Security Officer (SSO) or
Downgrader for example), then the user must change his/her
role to meet the requirements of the operation.
The READ function allows the user to read circumscribed
information. Since the SAM provides no data manipulation
(to include searching and conditional selection of tuples),
read operations are performed on a table level basis. All
tuples of a table which pass the filtering process are
forwarded to the requesting user for any manipulation. In
order to direct the SAM to the appropriate table, the UTM
must solicit the table's name from the user. Since the
Schema, Users, Trans_role, Trans_compart , Trans_caveat , and
Mail Directory Tables are unique tables, they may be
referenced directly by a form of their type such as Schema,
Users, Trans_role, Trans_compart , Trans_caveat , and
Directory.
Since the remaining tables are not unique (multiple
occurrences of each type), an extended name must be provided
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to direct the SAM. In order to reference a particular Mail
Data Table, Mail Message Control Table, or Directory Table
Access Table, the extended name must include a reference to
the applicable Mail Data Table and an indication o-f the
table type. Since addresses, as described in Chapter 4, are
used to deliver mail to a given Mail Data Table, it seems
logical to use the address to indicate the applicable Mail
Data Table. Thus, a read request to the author's Directory
Table Access Table might include RWYATT to indicate the
applicable Mail Data Table and DIRECTORY ACCESS to indicate
the table type. In a similar manner, to access a given Body
Table, or Access Control Table associated with a given mail
message, the user would have to supply the address of the
applicable Mail Data Table, the DTE of the associated
message, and the table type. The Object Control Table is
system controlled and is, therefore, not readable by a
user.
Unlike the read operation, which is performed on the
table level, the write operation is performed on the tuple
level (except in the case of the Body Table). Thus, the
WRITE function must direct the SAM to the right table and
tuple. The same table addressing scheme used by the READ
function can be used for the WRITE function. For each tuple
of information to be written in the indicated table, a
unique identifier must accompany the information to direct
the writing to the proper tuple. It should be noted that
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while the object itself may be changed during a write
operation, the classification o-f the object remains the
same. Figure 6.1 indicates a possible identifier to use in








6. Mail Directory Table
7. Mail Data Table
8. Mail Message Control Table
9. Directory Table Access Table












Figure 6.1. Possible identifiers for locating tuples
Again, the Object Control Table is not accessible by the
user. In the case of the Body Table, a write operation is
performed on the table level and only if the user has access
to all objects of the given Body Table. The reasoning behind
this is that the meaning of an object in the body table may
be taken in part from its context in relation to the other
objects of the Body Table. Without knowledge of the full
context, the user would not necessarily know how his/her
written object would be interpreted nor would he/she
necessarily be able to assess the true classification of
his/her object when written.
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The downgrade operation is treated as if it were a write
operation with the exception that the existing
classifications of written objects may be downgraded. The
DOWNGRADE function therefore solicits the same type of
information as the WRITE function.
For the SEND function the UTM must also solicit
direction to the correct Mail Data Table. This would consist
of the address as noted in Chapter 4. The UTM must determine
from the user the minimum clearance level, if any, to be
forwarded with the mail message.
The ERASE function acts on the tuple level and deletes
the given tuple. Access checking is performed as i-f it were
a write operation. Therefore, the UTM must solicit tuple
level direction information for the SAM in much the same
manner as with the WRITE function. Although the ERASE
function directs the deletion of a tuple in a given table,
the deletion may have far reaching effects. A tuple deleted
from the Mail Data Table causes the deletion of the entire
mail message (to include the associated Body Table), the
corresponding tuple in the Mail Message Control Table, the
associated Access Control Table, and the associated Object
Control Table. The deletion of a Mail Directory Table tuple
causes the deletion of the corresponding Mail Data Table,
associated Body Tables, and all control tables associated
with the Mail Data Table and the individual mail messages.
Such a deletion may only be made under the role of the SSO.
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C. COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY MODEL ASSERTIONS
Ten security assertions are made by the MMS security
model. These are detailed in Appendix A. Until now no
attempt has been made to tie design features to the security
assertions or vice versa. In this section these connections
will be presented. It should be noted that -for this
application, the concept of container has been addressed at
a logical level as opposed to a physical one. To this end,
the individual mail messages have been considered as the
only containers with regard to measures taken to meet the
security assertions. The discussion of compliance with the
security assertions of the MMS security model sire,
therefore, prefaced upon this concept of containers.
One may argue that Mail Data Tables should be considered
as containers also. Indeed the Mail Data Tables do contain
the classified messages in the physical sense, however, with
two notable exceptions, all access to classified information
is mediated based upon applying the MMS security assertions
on the level of individual messages. The first exception is
that the designated administrator may establish a minimum
clearance level requirement to be met by a user before
obtaining general access to the associated Mail Data Table.
This allows the administrator to accommodate the situation
where the relation formed when the given mail messages ^rs
gathered together requires a minimum level of
classification. Although success at this layer of access
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mediation allows general access to the Mail Data Table, it
does not generate an access to any classified information.
The user must still pass the access mediation required at
the individual mail message level to receive any classified
information.
The second exception is that the SSO role may delete a
Mail Data Table, and therefore its associated classified
data, by deleting the corresponding Mail Directory Table
tuple. While this is not a direct access, it does effect an




All accesses to individual mail messages are
filtered based on the Access Control Table associated with
the mail message. It lists each user or role authorized
access to the given mail message and the respective
authorized accesses. A user's access request will be
performed only if the user's user id or current role is in
the Access Control Table and he/she is authorized to perform
the requested access.
2. Classification hierarchy
The overall classification level of each message is
maintained in the corresponding Mail Message Control Table.
This value is established at the creation of the message and
reestablished after each subsequent write operation to the
mail message. Although this establishes the actual overall
classification of the mail message, the clearance level
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requirement -for the mail message may be established even
higher through the associated minimum clearance level
requirement also stored in the Mail Message Control Table.
3. Changes to objects
As indicated in Chapter 5, the cl assi -fi cation
associated with each object is attached to each tuple in the
UTM Table conveying that object. Authenticators are used to
guarantee the integrity of these classification markings.
If the user attempts to insert other previously classified
tuples of higher classification into an object of a lower
classification, then the UTM should be able to prevent
this. The final authority for detecting this, however, is
the SAM.
4. Viewing
During the SAM's filtering process, the
classification of each object not rejected by the access
authorization checking is checked against the maximum
classification level of data that can be sent to the user.
This maximum classification level is determined from the
maximum common values between the user's clearance level and
the cle^rAnce level of the terminal that he is operating
from. If the classification o-f the object exceeds the
maximum classification level, then the object is not
forwarded to the requesting user.
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5. Viewing CCR entities
A slight deviation has been made from the "Container
Clearance Required" concept presented in the MMS security
model. Instead of limiting the capability of specifying tne
minimum level of clearance required for accessing a
container to the clearance level of the container, the SSO
or Owner may indicate the specific level of clearance which
the user must meet for access. This includes levels of
clearance which may be greater than or less than the actual
clearance level o-f the container. These minimum
requirements must be met regardless oi whether the reference
is made directly or indirectly.
6. Translating indirect references
In all cases, the requesting user must meet the
Viewing and Viewing CCR Entities requirements as stated
above in order to see the ID of a container.
7. Labeling requirement
This is a UTM implementation oriented requirement
that has not been covered in the design presented here. The
classification associated with each object sent from the SAM
to the UTM is recorded with each tuple of that object. It
is expected that the classification of each object is
displayed with that object and that the overall
classification of all objects simultaneously displayed on
the terminal's screen is itself displayed appropriately at
117

the top and bottom of the screen, but no explicit provisions
have been made -for this.
8. Clearance setting
The clearance of each authorized user and terminal
is stored in the Users Table. Only the SSO role may access
this table.
9. Downgrading
The DOWNGRADING function has been provided as one of
the kernel interface functions for the system. Only through
this operation will the user be allowed to downgrade the
existing classification of an object.
10. Releasing
Since the application presented here is electronic
mail as opposed to a true message system, releasing has not
been incorporated. If releasing were to be incorporated, it
could be made into an application specific function and
handled in a manner similar to the SEND function.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THESIS DEVELOPMENT
This thesis supports the conceptual design of a
multilevel secure electronic mail application. Instead of
developing the entire conceptual design, to include the
design of application specific features as well as security
features, an approach was taken which called for designing
security features that would be integrated into an existing
conceptual design for an electronic mail application. The
existing conceptual design chosen was for the electronic
mail application of the Integrated Software System (ISS).
Thus, the central theme of this thesis has been the
conceptual design of those security features which would
permit a stand alone version of the ISS electronic mail
application to run in a multilevel security mode.
The thesis can basically be broken down into two parts,
each of which has its own subparts. In the first, a firm
framework of terminology and ideas was developed through a
systematic examination of the multilevel security issue and
related work. During the examination of formal models and
SIGMA, it became clear that the Bel 1-LaPadul a model would
not be appropriate for an electronic mail application. As a
consequence, the Military Message System security model was
chosen to guide the development of the necessary security
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features. In a similar manner, the review of the MULTISAFE
system pointed out the applicability of the general
modularization principles fostered in the development of
MULTISAFE. These principles became the foundation of the
modularization used in this thesis.
In the second part, the conceptual design of the
security features was developed. Its development followed
along the lines o-f the three objectives laid out in the
introduction. First, the attributes necessary to support
the required access mediation were defined. The defining of
the required attributes led to the identification of twelve
table types to be used in supporting the access mediation
and electronic mail application. With the twelve table
types, it was possible to separate the access control
information from the data it protected while maintaining all
relations which existed between the two.
Under the second objective, a modularization of
functions and information was developed. Following closely
the modularization scheme proposed for MULTISAFE, the
functions of the proposed multilevel secure electronic mail
application were divided among three modules: Security
Access Module (SAM), User Terminal Module (UTM) , and Storage
and Retrieval Module (SRM) . Since the SAM acts as the
mediator of all access requests, all of the access mediation
functions were concentrated in it. The separation of the
access control information from the data it protected, as
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noted above, allowed all access control information to be
resident in a database controlled solely by the SAM, tnus
enhancing the overall security of the system. The UTM was
assigned the functions of preprocessing user generated
access requests and data manipulation. The actual physical
storage of the mail messages was bestowed upon the SRM.
It was discovered that the modularization did fall short
in some areas of control once the data left the SAM for the
UTM or SRM. Primarily the areas were the unauthorized
manipulation of data while under the control of the UTM or
SRM and the unauthorized reading of data while under the
control of the SRM. Through the proposed use of
authenticators, the unauthorized manipulation o-f data can be
controlled to a great extent in both the UTM and the SRM. In
the case of the UTM, an additional table, the UTM Table, was
created to facilitate the transmission of data with
authenticators to the UTM. Encryption before storage offers
adequate protection against unauthorized reading of data
while under the control of the SRM.
In the last objective, the user interface to the access
mediator was defined. Maintaining the idea that the thesis
is a high level design, the interface was described in terms
of functions performed rather than explicit syntax and
semantics. In keeping with the general philosophy of the
ISS, the number of functions required was kept to a
minimum. Seven functions were identified. These seven
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functions could form a kernel of functions that would also
serve any other ISS application if integrated witn the
proposed electronic mail application.
B. CONCLUSIONS
It is somewhat difficult to draw conclusions about the
conceptual design presented here. At best, it presents a
somewhat formalized train of thought. There are no scales
of measurement against which it can be judged for goodness,
completeness, or worth. At best one can say, "Well, it
looks good, seems complete, and may have some value." Any
actual measurements would have to wait until future stages
of development. It is left to the reader to pronounce the
judgement of whether the design presents sufficient merit to
continue its development. What will be presented here are
those merits which the author considers important and some
thoughts on the method of development.
As mentioned above, there are no true scales of
measurement for this conceptual design. One can, however,
establish those parts of the design which are felt to comply
with the security assumptions of the MMS security model.
This has been done in Chapter 6. In review, it was shown
that compliance can be established for seven of the ten
assumptions. As far as the remaining three, each snould be
looked at separately. For "Viewing CCR entities", it is not
a case of non-compliance, but one of a change of approach
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which is felt to increase the -flexibility of the intent
behind the "Viewing CCR entities" assertion. If it is felt
that the original intent should be implemented, the
necessary attributes aire present which would allow a rapid
change. With regard to the "Labeling requirement", there is
no compliance. This is not because noncompliance is
intended, but rather due to the idea that compliance would
be established at a future stage when it is decided exactly
how to handle obtaining the classification of an object from
the user. It is felt that that decision is too close to the
implementation stage to be presented in this design.
Finally, it is felt that the "Releasing" assertion does not
properly apply to the electronic mail application but could
be implemented if necessary. Thus, all of the assertions
are accounted for, could be accounted for, or will be
accounted for in a final implementation.
The modularization does pose the possibility' of the
absence or at least the minimization of certain possible
problems. Although this is a multiuser system, there is
virtually no way that one user can affect another except
through authorized means of communication. For example, the
transactional nature of the design would preclude the
possibility of one user's process affecting another users
as is the case in many other multiuser systems. The
likelihood of the existence and the range of effect of
subversive user action, such as a Trojan Horse, would be
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minimized. Since the underlying concept is that all UTM
software used by the user is downloaded and not copied back,
a Trojan Horse would have to use the same lines of
communication as the user and go through the same access
checking in order to get information back to another user.
This should be easily detectable. In the case of Trojan
Horses in the SRM software, all the classified data is
encrypted making it useless to another user without the
decryption key. The only ^rea where a Trojan Horse might
have a valuable effect is in the SAM. If the SAM is verified
and adequately protected, the existence of a Trojan Horse
there would be impossible.
As a final note on the proposed modularization of the
electronic mail application, it should be noted that it is
not required that each module be physically separated from
the other modules. This is one passible implementation
method but not the only one. Such a configuration might be
useful in the situation where a central unit which services
a number of simultaneous user workstations by mediating
access to a common bank of secondary storage. Another
possible situation is a stand alone single user workstation
which services one user at a time but may service a number
of users over a period of time. An example would be a word
processor with a Winchester disk for secondary storage. In




As a comment on using an existing conceptual design o-f
an electronic mail application, it should be noted that the
conceptual design o-f features to make it multilevel secure
was made easier, but one must be aware of possible
pitfalls. Like an actual implementation, an existing
conceptual design can also introduce restrictions ii one
allows it. To an extent this is the case here, but probably
on a much smaller scale. Initially too much emphasis was
placed on maintaining some of existing design concepts.
Eventually it was determined that the original design would
have to be modified to accommodate the proposed security
features. This led to some delay in developing the design
and some probable inefficiency which may still exist. If it
were to be done again, some changes would be made. As an
example, it might be better to store mail messages entirely
in fixed format Mail Data Tables. An appropriate format
might be akin to that of the UTM Table.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
As a general recommendation, it is felt that the
development of the multilevel secure electronic mail
application should be continued. In terms of specif ic
recommendations, there are three. The first stems from
experience developed during the conceptual design presented
here. The development of multilevel security features is
extremely complex. Many blind alleys were searched before
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the -features presented here were reached. It is strongly
recommended that any future work on the design be done as a
group effort instead of individual effort. This would
probably eliminate many blind alleys or at least shorten
them. With an existing base design, the work could be
divided up, allowing more individual attention to details.
A heavy emphasis should be put on efficiency and
parallelism of operation. At the conceptual level it is
difficult to do this because there are no means of
measurement. As the development continues, though,
measurement should become possible. Since security does
increase the overhead of operations, all attempts should be
made to minimize its effect. Minimization, however, will
have to be tempered by some type of analysis which will
identify the point at which further efforts at minimization
would no longer cost beneficial.
Finally, a serious examination should be made into
storing all the mail messages of a given user in a single
fixed format Mail Data Table as opposed to the presently
proposed situation where mail messages are split between the
Mail Data Table and the respective Body Tables. This would
present more uniformity and allow easier adaptation of the





This Appendix depicts the security model of the Military
Message System (MMS) through an excerpt trom "Military
Message Systems: Requirements and Security Model".
CRef. 15: pp. 6-103
IV. SECURITY MODEL
The security model for the MMS -family is intended to
provide a framework for users to understand system security,
to guide the design of each family member, and to provide a
basis for certifiers to review the system- Although we
intend to have a single security model for the entire MMS
family, each member will require a separate security
analysis. The model presented here is informal; we expect
it to provide a basis for a more formal version that may be
used as a basis for program verification efforts.
In this section we define some terms, use them to
specify a model of how a user views the system's operation,
and state assumptions and assertions, based on the terms and
the model of operation, that are intended to be sufficient
to assure the security of the system. The security model
includes the definitions, user's view of operation, the
assumptions, and the assertions. It is a revision of
earlier work.
This model does not address auditing, although message
systems clearly require auditing mechanisms. The existence
of an audit trail may deter potential penetrators, but
auditing is primarily a technique for detecting security
violations after the fact. The security model focuses on
assertions that, if correctly enforced, will prevent
security violations. Consequently, assertions and
assumptions about auditing do not appear; in a more detailed
system specification, auditing requirements would be
expl ici t.
Def ini ti ons
in
The definitions below correspond in most cases to those
general use and are given here simply to establish an
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explicit basis for the moael . We distinguish between
"objects", which are single-level, and "containers", which
are multilevel. We also introduce the concept of "user
roles", which correspond to particular job-related sets of
pri vi leges.
Classification: a designation attached to information that
reflects the damage that could be caused by-
unauthorized disclosure of that information. A
classification includes a sensitivity level
(UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET)
and a set of zero or more compartments (NATO,
NUCLEAR, etc.). The set of classifications,
together with the relation defining the allowed
information flows between levels, form a lattice.
Most dissemination controls, such as NATO only,
NOFORN, and NOCONTRACTOR, can be handled as
additional compartment names.
Clearance: the degree of trust associated with a person.
This is established on the basis of background
investigations and the functions required of the
individual. It is expressed in the same way as
classifications are^ as a sensitivity level and a
(possibly null) compartment set. In a secure MMS,
each user will have a clearance, and functions
performed by the MMS for that user may check the
user's clearance and the classifications of objects
to be operated on. Some other characteristics of a
user, such as his nationality and employer, may also
be treated as part of his clearance so that
dissemination controls are handled properly within
this framework.
User ID: a character string used to denote a user of the
system. To use the MMS, a person must present a
userlD to the system, and the system must
authenticate that the user is the person
corresponding to that user ID. This procedure is
called logging in. Since clearances are recorded on
the basis of one per user ID, each user should have a
unique userlD.
User: A person who is authorized to use the MMS.
Role: The job the user is performing, such as downgrader,
releaser, distributor, etc. A user is always
associated with at least one role at any instant,
and the user can change roles during a session. To
act in a given role, the user must be authorized for
it. Some roles may be assumed by only one user at a
time (e.g., distributor). With each role comes the
ability to perform certain functions.
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Object: an abstraction implemented by an MMS. An object is
the smallest unit a-f information in the system to
which a classification is explicitly attacned. An
object thus contains no other objects — it is not
multilevel. There are many kinds of objects: an
example is the data-time—group of a message.
Container: an abstraction implemented by an MMS. A container
has a classification and may contain objects (each
with its own classification) and/or other
containers. In most MMS family members, message
files and messages are containers. Some fields a-f a
message (such as the Text field) may be containers
as well. The distinction between an object and a
container is based on type, not current contents:
within a family member, if an entity of type message
file is a container, then all message files in that
family member are containers, even if some of them
are empty or contain only objects and/or containers
classified at the same level as the message file
itself. Devices such as disks, printers, tape
drives, and users' terminals will be containers,
rather than objects, in most MMS family members.
Entity: either a container or an object.
Container Clearance Required (CCR) : an attribute a-f some
containers. For some containers, it is important to
require a minimum clearance, so that if a user does
not have at least this clearance , he cannot view any
of the entities within the container. Such
containers are marked with the attribute "Container
Clearance Required" (CCR). For example, a user with
only a CONFIDENTIAL clearance could be prohibited
from viewing just the CONFIDENTIAL paragraphs of a
message classified TOP SECRET. On the other hand,
given a message file containing both TOP SECRET and
CONFIDENTIAL messages, it may be acceptable to allow
the user in question to view the CONFIDENTIAL ones,
even though the container (message file) as a while
is classified TOP SECRET.
ID: identifier. An ID names an entity without referring
to other entities. For example, the originator and
date—time-group of a message constitute an ID for
that message. Some, but not necessarily all,
entities are named by identifiers. Entities may
also be named in other ways, e.g., "the third




Direct reference: a reference to an entity is direct i f trie
entity's ID is used to name it.
Indirect reference: a reference to an entity is indirect if
a seauence of two or more entity names (of which
only the first may be an ID) is used to name it.
Operation: a function that can be applied to an entity. It
may simply allow that entity to be viewed (e.g.,
display a message), or it may modify the entity
(update a message), or both (create a message). Some
functions may involve more that one entity (copy a
message from one message file to another).
Access Set: a set of pairs (user ID or role, operation) that
is associated with an entity. The operations that
may be specified for a particular entity depend on
the type of that entity. For messages, operations
include DISPLAY, UPDATE, DELETE, etc." The existence
of a particular pair in the access set implies that
the user corresponding to the specified userlD or
role is authorized to invoke the specified operation
on the entity with which the set is associated.
Message: a particular type implemented by an MMS. In more
MMS family members, a message will be a container,
though messages may be objects in-some receive-only
systems. A message will include To, From,
Date-Time-Group, Subject, and Text fields, and
additional fields as well. A draft message also
includes Drafter and Releaser fields.
User's View of MMS Operation
We present the following as a model of the use of a
secure MMS. Terms defined above are printed in upper case.
People initiate use of the system by logging in. To log
in, a person presents USERID and the system performs
authentication, using passwords, fingerprint recognition, or
any appropriate technique. Following a successful
authentication, the USER invokes OPERATIONS to perform the
functions of the message system. the OPERATIONS a USER may
invoke depend on his USERID and his current ROLE; by
applying OPERATIONS, the USER may view or modify OBJECTS or
CONTAINERS. The system enforces the security assertions
listed below (that is, it prevents the user from performing




It will always be possible for a valid user to
compromise information to which he has legitimate access.
To make the dependence of system security on user behavior
explicit, we list the following assumptions. These
assumptions are really security assertions that can only be
enforced by the users of the system.
Ai. The System Security Officer (SSO) is assumed to
assign clearances, device classifications, and roles
proper 1 y.
A2. The user is assumed to enter the correct
classification when composing, editing, or
reclassifying information.
A3. Within a classification, the user is assumed to
address messages and to define access sets for
entities he creates so that only users with a valid
need—to—know can view the information.
A4. The user is assumed to control properly information
extracted from containers marked CCR (i.e., to
exercise discretion in moving that information to
entities that may not be marked CCR).
The basis for these assumptions is that when there is no
other source of information about the classification a-f an
entity or the clearance of a person, the user is assumed to
provide information that is correct.
Security Assertions
The following statements are to be demonstrated to hold
for a multilevel secure MMS:
Authorization 1. A user cam only invoke an operation on an
entity if the user's userlD or current
role appears in the entity's access set
along with that operation.
Classification 2. The classification of any container is
hierarchy always at least as high as the maximum of
the classifications of the entities it
contains.
Changes to 3. Information removed from an object
objects inherits the classification of that
object. Information inserted into an
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object must not be classified at a level
above the classification o-f that object.
Vi ewing A user can only view (on some output
medium) an entity with a classification
less than or equal to the user s
clearance and the classification of the
output medium. (This assertion applies





A user can view an indirectly re-ferencsd
entity within a container marked
"Container Clearance Required" only if
the user's clearance is greater than or





A user can obtain the ID for an entity
that he has re-ferr&d to indirectly only




Any entity viewed by a user mu?




8. Only a user with the role of System
Security Officer can set the clearance
recorded for a user ID.
Downgrading No classification marking can be
downgraded except by a user with the role
of downgrader who has invoked a downgrade
operation.
Releasing 10. No draft message can be released except
by a user with the role of releaser. The
user ID of the releaser must be recorded
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